No one denies that this
power [of jurisdiction] is from Christ, since all power in the Church is from
Him, or that it is immediately from God in that God acts immediately in and
with the action of all other causes. . . .
There are some who
suppose that the ordinary jurisdiction of bishops is received immediately from
Christ. . . . Many others think that although Christ instituted the
episcopate willing that His Church be ruled by bishops, ordinary jurisdiction
is conferred by the pope on individual bishops. . . .
In the first
hypothesis, it is asserted that the Roman pontiff cannot licitly and validly
remove or restrict the jurisdiction of a bishop without just cause: once the
condition of the Roman pontiff having assigned subjects to a bishop is
satisfied, the jurisdiction received by bishops is given by God, for it is this
jurisdiction of divine origin that is exercised. The Roman pontiff may indeed
regulate and modify this jurisdiction for reasons derived from just causes. He
can even in certain cases declare that this jurisdiction has been lost, in
virtue of his right to interpret divine law. He cannot however directly remove
jurisdiction from a bishop, because this jurisdiction does not exist in its
subject through him, but by divine law; and divine law takes precedence over
papal authority.
In the second
hypothesis, the pope cannot indeed licitly remove a bishop without cause, but
he can certainly validly do this, and his act will have force on its own; a
bishop in this situation cannot claim jurisdiction for himself on the pretext
that there is no just cause for his removal (p. 5).
Then he adds that “the claim that God has granted the pope the whole of ecclesiastical power provides the justification for the claim that bishops receive the power of jurisdiction directly from the pope and only mediately from God, and hence that the pope can remove a bishop from office at will” (p. 3). Yet he again uses the expression “the whole of ecclesiastical power” (p. 3) and in another instance, “the pope has all the power of jurisdiction” (p. 3).
Dr. Lamont labels this position “the strong view of papal jurisdiction” (p. 3) since it holds that the pope possesses “not just supreme power of jurisdiction, but the whole of the power of jurisdiction” (p. 3) and the opposite position, which denies it, “the moderate view of papal jurisdiction” (p. 3).
It turns out that the translation of the Dictionnaire serving as the basis for characterizing the current he calls the “strong view” is incorrect. The French original says that the pope has been entrusted with “la plenitude du pouvoir ecclésiastique” (p. 35) literally, “the fullness of ecclesiastical power,” not “the whole of ecclesiastical power.” The first meaning (fullness) is all the more precise because the phrase refers to chapter 3 of the dogmatic constitution Pastor aeternus, which, referring to the pope’s primacy, quotes the Council of Florence’s statement that “to him [the pope], in blessed Peter, full power has been given by our lord Jesus Christ to tend, rule and govern the universal Church.” Further on, the constitution refers to the “supreme power which the Roman Pontiff has in governing the whole Church.”[4]
Now, saying that the pope enjoys full and supreme power (plena potestas pascendi, regendi et gubernandi—“full power was given to him . . . to feed, rule, and govern” says the Council of Florence[5]) is very different than affirming that he received “the whole of ecclesiastical power,” meaning that he is the only one who holds power in the Church and that all other powers would be a delegation of his. Dr. Lamont recognizes the difference between the two concepts, as he attacks the windmill he created with his mistranslation by stating (this time with a correct translation): “‘Plenitude of power’ in this conciliar text [Pastor aeternus] means having all the power of jurisdiction that it is possible to have, not all the power of jurisdiction that exists” (p. 3).
It so happens that this restricted interpretation of plena potestas is exactly the position of the theologian Domenico Palmieri, whose Tractatus de romano pontífice Dr. Lamont quotes at length but mistakenly calls the “best case for the strong view” (p. 4; i.e., “the whole of ecclesiastical power”). It is enough to quote his own words to prove that Palmieri upholds the narrow interpretation that Dr. Lamont subscribes to and calls the “moderate view of papal jurisdiction”:
The [pope’s] plenitude
of power that is being discussed is not absolute, but is relative to the
society that is ruled; it is plenitude of power in a polity and for a polity.
To give clarity, we can say that it can be understood in two ways: only
positively, or exclusively. It is understood in a positive sense only, if the
supreme ruler can by his ordinary legal authority perform everything that is
useful and necessary for the entire polity and every one of its subjects, although there are subordinate powers
together with him and under him, that exercise authority that is not derived
from him. It is understood in an exclusive sense, if the supreme ruler’s
authority is such that every power in the polity is either his own power, or is
derived from his own power in such a way that the supreme power either formally
or virtually contains every other power by which the polity is ruled. Such is
the power of absolute monarchy in a political society.
It is easy to show that the plenitude of power belongs
to the Roman Pontiff in the first sense (p. 4).
What Dr. Lamont calls the “strong view,” Domenico
Palmieri calls the “exclusive sense,” which he rejects; and what Dr. Lamont
calls the “moderate view,” Palmieri calls the “positive sense” (p. 4), the
restricted sense he defends. Therefore, it is absolutely inappropriate to
classify it as a “best case for the strong view.”
Unfortunately, this misrepresentation of the position
of those who deny that the power of jurisdiction is granted to bishops at
consecration—as if they thought that bishops are mere delegates of the pope,
who supposedly would hold “the whole of ecclesiastical power”—runs through and
disqualifies Dr. Lamont’s entire study.
Misrepresentation of the Thought of Francisco de Vitoria
Lamont misrepresented not only the position of Domenico Palmieri, however, but also that
of Francisco de Vitoria, the author he introduces as the supposed champion of
the thesis of the sacramental origin of the power of episcopal jurisdiction. In
his eyes, Vitoria’s Relectiones are
the ones that best represent the “moderate view on papal jurisdiction.”
In the long text quoted, the great theologian and
founder of the Salamanca School begins by proving, with the support of passages
from Scripture, that the Twelve received the apostolic mission and consequent
power directly from Jesus Christ and that “every apostle had ecclesiastical
power covering the whole world, for all the acts that Peter had power to do”
(p. 10), except those that belong exclusively to the supreme pontiff, such as
convening a general council. Vitoria then goes on to maintain that “any of the
apostles aside from Peter could leave a successor, not a universal one, but in
any province that he wished, who would be the true bishop of that province” (p.
11)—as Saint Paul did with Titus and Timothy. Furthermore, “not only the apostles
could leave successors, but any of their successors could similarly do so” (p.
11) because “at that time it could have been of the greatest importance that a
bishop nominate his successor during his lifetime” (p. 12) since “it would not
only be possible and proper but necessary at all times. How could a dead bishop
in the farthest reaches of India await a mandate from Peter to meet the need of
a new bishop?” (p. 12). Vitoria goes even further by stating that “any bishop,
even without consulting the see of Peter, can establish a law stating that
priests elect the bishop, or that bishops are instituted by some other form”
(p. 12).
He concludes: “This is the reason why the authority
and dignity of a bishop can be derived successively from one bishop to the next
until it reaches us, and through the bishop all other inferior power” (p. 12).
This power would not contradict the pope’s plenitudo
potestatis because “the successors of Peter can at their discretion create
bishops in new provinces, abolish existing laws on the succession of bishops,
establish new laws on this subject, divide provinces, and do all things
pertaining to these matters by their own judgment and power” (p. 12).
Our purpose here is not to analyze Vitoria’s proposal
that a bishop’s election and the transmission of jurisdiction be done by his
predecessor or a method established by him without the intervention of the Holy
See. We want to emphasize that at no point does Vitoria say that the power of
jurisdiction is granted directly by Christ in the act of episcopal
consecration, which is the real issue under discussion.
On the contrary, he categorically states that “Peter’s
power was greater” (p. 10) than that received by the other apostles because “Firstly,
it was an ordinary power, whereas the power of the apostles was an
extraordinary one” (p. 10). “Secondly—which follows from this—the power of
Peter remained in the Church, whereas the power of the apostles did not” (p.
10). And then he concludes: “Aside from the holy apostles, no one else in the Church received ecclesiastical power from Christ.
. . . and thus we have the
first origin of ecclesiastical power; for the
twelve apostles were the first and only persons to receive this power from
Christ, our Lord and Redeemer” (p. 10).
Furthermore, at the end of the passage from Relatione II, quoted by Dr. Lamont,
Vitoria says, “It was said to Peter, ‘Feed my sheep,’ with no limitations or
exceptions. Therefore all direction pertains to Peter without any exception,
and in consequence even the creation of bishops falls under his power” (p. 12). He continues: “From this the corollary clearly follows that one
cannot now become a bishop except according to the forms laid down by the supreme
pontiff, and that if anyone attempts to
do otherwise, nothing will result; such an attempt will be null and void. I
state this however about the authority of jurisdiction, for what pertains to
consecration is different. Secondly, it follows that all ecclesiastical
power, whether of orders or of jurisdiction, depends mediately or immediately on the see of Peter” (p.
12).
In this paragraph, Vitoria clearly distinguishes
between the power of order (granted directly by Christ), whose transmission
without a license from the pope renders it illicit but not invalid, and the
power of jurisdiction, whose transmission without a canonical mission granted
or recognized by the pope renders it null and legally invalid.
If the issue under discussion were whether the apostles
received jurisdiction directly from Christ or through Saint Peter, Vitoria’s
long quotation would serve its purpose. But that is not what Dr. Lamont is
questioning in my article, which is not even remotely about that. He wanted to
prove that the bishop receives the power of jurisdiction immediately from
Christ at his consecration. The quotation from Vitoria is totally inappropriate
and even counterproductive for this purpose, because the Salamanca theologian
explicitly says that no one after the apostles received jurisdiction directly
from Christ.
Underrating Pius XII’s Teaching
As mentioned, the thesis of the immediate reception of
jurisdiction from the pope’s hands enjoyed the support of the vast majority of
the best theological authors and treatises before Vatican II. What is more, it
was explicitly put into practice in the 1917 Code of Canon Law and was taught
in three documents by Pius XII: the encyclical on the Church, Mystici Corporis Christi (1943), and the
encyclicals Ad Sinarum Gentem (1954)
and Ad Apostolorum Principis (1958)
addressed to the Chinese Catholic bishops and people. In my article, I stated
that the Second Vatican Council “opposed the Church’s traditional magisterium
when declaring that the ‘episcopal consecration, together with the office of
sanctifying, also confers the office of teaching and governing’ (no. 21).” Dr.
Lamont asks: “Is Mr. Ureta right in claiming that the teaching of the
theological school that he supports is taught by the magisterium?” (p. 2).
He develops the theme in section III of his study,
titled “Magisterial Teaching on Papal and Episcopal Jurisdiction” (p. 18),
which begins by recognizing that “the position of the magisterium on this subject
is not expressed in a simple manner. A careful analysis of a number of
magisterial texts is required in order to identify what this position is” (p.
18).
The first text Dr. Lamont analyzes is Leo XIII’s
encyclical Satis Cognitum, which
affirms what no one denies, namely that “if the authority of Peter and his
successors is plenary and supreme, it is not to be regarded as the sole
authority,” since “by the fact that the bishops succeed the apostles, they
inherit their ordinary power, and thus the episcopal order necessarily belongs
to the essential constitution of the Church” (p. 18). However, the pope adds,
it is necessary to bear in mind “that nothing was conferred on the apostles
apart from Peter, but that several things were conferred upon Peter apart from
the apostles” (p. 18), so that “whatever authority and office the apostles
received, they received in conjunction with Peter” (p. 18). Quoting his
predecessor and namesake Saint Leo the Great, Pope Leo XIII even seems to
contradict Francisco de Vitoria’s thesis: “If the divine benignity willed
anything to be in common between him [Peter] and the other princes, whatever He
did not deny to the others He gave only
through him. So that whereas Peter alone received many things, He conferred nothing on any of the rest
without Peter participating in it” (S. Leo M. sermo iv., cap. 2)” (p. 18).
Let us remember that the debate is not whether the
apostles received power directly from Our Lord or through Saint Peter. In any
case, even Vitoria, who supports the former, explicitly states that this would
have been the Twelve’s exclusive and non-transferable privilege. However, if Saint
Leo the Great and Leo XIII maintain that even the apostles received power
through the mediation of Peter, a fortiori, they would be inclined to maintain
that bishops receive jurisdiction indirectly from God but directly from the
pontifical mandate, although they do not specifically address the issue.
Despite this, and without any textual support but
based solely on his misrepresentation of Palmieri’s position, Dr. Lamont draws
the opposite conclusion. At first, he limits himself to saying that Leo XIII’s
description of the jurisdiction of the pope and the bishops on the face of it
“expresses the moderate view” (p. 19). This is true if, by “moderate view,” one
means what the whole world agrees on, namely that the pope does not have “the
whole of ecclesiastical power.” But it is incorrect to ascribe to Leo XIII the
opinion that bishops receive jurisdiction directly from Christ, as Dr. Lamont
does later on, stating: “The assertion that episcopal consecration confers the
office of teaching and governing is a recognized position in Catholic theology
. . . . It is supported by the teaching of Leo XIII” (p. 23). The
quoted papal text does not support this statement.
Even the last sentence of the encyclical quoted by Dr.
Lamont would incline one to deduce the opposite. Speaking of bishops who
deliberately secede from Peter and his successors, Leo XIII says: “they are
exiled from the Kingdom, the keys of which were given by Christ to
Peter alone” (p. 18). As is well known, all theologians teach that the keys
represent the power of jurisdiction.
In addition to misinterpreting the encyclical Satis Cognitum, Dr. Lamont attempts to
diminish the magisterial value of Pius XII’s encyclical Mystici Corporis, which states unequivocally that although the
bishops’ jurisdiction is inherent in their office, “they receive [it] directly
from the same supreme pontiff” (p. 19), a statement he repeated in the
encyclicals Sinarum Gentem and Ad Apostolorum Principis, nine and
fifteen years later respectively. Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani went so far as to
say that these statements by Pius XII meant that the traditional majority
opinion that bishops receive jurisdiction from God not directly but indirectly
“should now . . . be rated as absolutely certain” (p. 19).
Dr. Lamont is right to question this statement by the
last great holder of the Holy Office, explaining that “in order to end a
dispute of this kind by a magisterial intervention, such an intervention must
clearly describe the question, express the intention of settling it, specify
the position being taught, and make it clear that the teaching is binding on
all Catholics” (p. 21).
Even assuming that this is not the case, we would be
in the situation Pius XII mentioned in Humani
generis:
Nor must it be thought that what is expounded in encyclical letters does not of itself demand consent, since in writing such letters the popes do not exercise the supreme power of their teaching authority. For these matters are taught with the ordinary teaching authority, of which it is true to say: ‘He who heareth you, heareth me’ (Luke 10:16); and generally what is expounded and inculcated in encyclical letters already for other reasons appertains to Catholic doctrine. But if the supreme pontiffs in their official documents purposely pass judgment on a matter up to that time under dispute, it is obvious that that matter, according to the mind and will of the pontiffs, cannot be any longer considered a question open to discussion among theologians.[6]
However, from Cardinal Ottaviani’s supposedly
exaggerated remark—dato non concesso—Dr.
Lamont draws a conclusion that could be misleading. He states that “the
passages from the encyclicals of Pius XII that are cited above cannot be seen
as a proper and responsible exercise of the papal teaching office” (p. 21).
This could be understood by people less versed in theology to mean that the
ordinary papal magisterium does not constitute a proper and responsible
exercise of the papal teaching office, which would consist of the promulgation
of dogmas of faith. I do not believe Dr. Lamont thinks that, but it is one of
the meanings of his phrase.
Unfortunately, readers could be led to interpret it
that way because, he implies right afterwards that this would not even have
been Pius XII’s opinion as a private doctor: “One may speculate that these
passages were included in the texts of these encyclicals by drafters at the
Holy Office (of which Cardinal Ottaviani was the head at the time) in order to
further the cause of a theological opinion that they accepted” (p. 21). Regretfully,
in attributing this passage from Mystici
corporis to Cardinal Ottaviani or his staff, Dr. Lamont failed to check dates and made a historical error: The
encyclical was published in 1943, but Cardinal Ottaviani was only appointed secretary of the Congregation of the Holy
Office—of which the pope was the prefect—in 1959, sixteen years later. It is
hard to imagine that Ottaviani would have had enough influence in 1943 to insert
a theological opinion different from Pope Pacelli’s in one his most important
encyclicals.
Overrating Vatican II’s Magisterial Authority
In defending his position, Dr. Lamont not only
downplays the magisterial value of Mystici
Corporis, but magnifies the magisterial value of Vatican II’s dogmatic constitution
Lumen Gentium by taking advantage of
the adjective “dogmatic” in its title to deduce that its teachings are
definitive:
The documents of the
Second Vatican Council are of different kinds, and many of these kinds of
document—decrees, declarations, etc.—do not have a great degree of authority.
The case of a dogmatic constitution is different. Such constitutions are a
recognized form of conciliar teaching; the documents Dei Filius and Pastor
aeternus of the First Vatican Council are dogmatic constitutions. They express by their titles the intention
of teaching Catholic dogma in an authoritative fashion. A dogmatic
constitution has a much higher degree of authority than the encyclicals of Pius
XII cited above, which are the only magisterial statements that support Mr.
Ureta’s position (p. 23).
This parallel between Vatican I and Vatican II
constitutions is absolutely improper because it is based on an entirely
secondary aspect, such as a title. A document’s title is not enough to express
“the intention of teaching Catholic dogma in an authoritative fashion” (p. 23)
as Dr. Lamont correctly stated when denying the binding character of the
passages quoted from Pius XII’s encyclicals. As already mentioned, to be
definitive, “such an intervention must clearly describe the question, express
the intention of settling it, specify the position being taught, and make it
clear that the teaching is binding on all Catholics” (p. 21). None of the
Vatican II documents—including Lumen Gentium—express
the intention of definitively settling a theological question, making it binding
on all Catholics.
While no one doubts that the latest Council enjoyed
supreme magisterial authority, everyone recognizes—except for supporters of the
hermeneutic of rupture—that the Council Fathers renounced exercising their
infallible authority to give it the pastoral character that John XIII suggested
in his inaugural speech.
This is particularly true of Lumen Gentium, for which Paul VI ordered to be annexed as an
appendix to the statement issued at the 123rd general congregation. It reads:
A question has arisen
regarding the precise theological note which should be attached to the doctrine
that is set forth in the Schema de Ecclesia and is being put to a vote.
The
Theological Commission has given the following response regarding the Modi that
have to do with Chapter III of the de Ecclesia Schema: “As is self-evident, the
Council’s text must always be interpreted in accordance with the general rules
that are known to all.”
On
this occasion the Theological Commission makes reference to its Declaration of
March 6, 1964, the text of which we transcribe here:
“Taking conciliar custom into consideration and also the pastoral purpose of the present Council, the sacred Council defines as binding on the Church only those things in matters of faith and morals which it shall openly declare to be binding. The rest of the things which the sacred Council sets forth, inasmuch as they are the teaching of the Church’s supreme magisterium, ought to be accepted and embraced by each and every one of Christ’s faithful according to the mind of the sacred Council. The mind of the Council becomes known either from the matter treated or from its manner of speaking, in accordance with the norms of theological interpretation.”[7]
The manner of speaking of the First Vatican Council’s
constitutions Dei Filius and Aeterni Patris clearly expresses the
will to define and concludes with anathemas for those who deny its teachings.
For example, the chapter on the primacy of the pope begins by saying “We teach and declare that
. . . .” It continues by saying “We promulgate anew the definition of the ecumenical Council of Florence,
which must be believed by all
faithful Christians.” And it concludes by saying, “Therefore, we condemn and
reject the opinions of those who hold that . . . .” And,
further, “So then, should anyone, which God forbid, have the temerity to reject
this definition of ours; let him be anathema.”[8]
Absolutely none of this can be found in Lumen gentium’s manner of speaking or
any other document of Vatican II. Furthermore, at the close of Vatican II, Paul
VI explicitly declared that in the Council, “the teaching authority of the
Church . . . [did] not [wish] to issue extraordinary dogmatic pronouncements.”[9]
Why, then, was Lumen
gentium titled “dogmatic” constitution? A malicious observer would say it
was to mislead the unwary. We prefer to follow the assessment of Arnaldo Xavier
da Silveira in addressing this objection: “The adjective ‘dogmatic’ only means
that the subject matter is related to dogma. Just as everything that can be
read in a manual of Dogmatic Theology is not dogma.”[10]
For all of the above, Dr. Lamont errs when he affirms
“The statements of Lumen gentium on
episcopal jurisdiction are therefore authoritative and final, and must, as far
as they go, be accepted” (p. 23). On the contrary, it is precisely their
character as an ordinary, non-dogmatic magisterium that allows scholars to
question with great freedom the theological novelties of these documents,
which, in their natural sense, seem to break with the traditional teaching of
the Church. They include, among others, religious freedom, the salvific
character of heretical or schismatic sects, and “collegiality,” which breaks
with the dogma of papal primacy by affirming the existence of two permanent
supreme powers in the Church and which departs from the teaching of Pius XII
and the past’s majority current of theologians by affirming that the power of
jurisdiction is received directly from God at the episcopal consecration.
It is surprising that a traditionalist author like Dr.
Lamont states “It cannot be claimed to be a view that was introduced into the
document by modernists wishing to advance their cause” (p. 23) to defend this Lumen Gentium novelty. He seems unaware that chapter III of Lumen Gentium provoked the greatest
reaction from the Coetus Internationalis Patris and even prompted a letter to
Paul VI signed by twenty-five cardinals and thirteen superiors of religious
orders. In it, they denounced precisely the pressure from the progressive wing
to have the “collegiality” novelty and the sacramentality of the power of
jurisdiction accepted. The letter, sent by Cardinal Arcadio Larraona on
everyone’s behalf, states:
The new doctrine has become neither more certain, nor objectively more probable than before as a result of the disturbing campaign of pressure groups who have deplorably politicized the council and disconcerted some episcopates . . . . Nor has it become more certain as a result of the actions of many audacious experts who, unfaithful to their true ministry, made biased propaganda instead of objectively enlightening the bishops by acquainting them with the status quaestionis. And, finally, it has not become probable through wide coverage of the press, which, with its characteristic methods—methods utilized by the progressives—has created an atmosphere which makes calm discussion difficult, fettering and hampering true liberty by making those who do not show approval appear ridiculous and unpopular. In such an atmosphere scientific reasoning can no longer exert its legitimate influence in any practical way and does not even get a hearing.[11]
Indeed, it can be claimed that the less probable view
on the origin of episcopal jurisdiction was introduced into Lumen Gentium by modernists wishing to
advance their cause.
An Insufficient Explanation for an Unavoidable Historical-Canonical Objection
In his letter to Paul VI, Cardinal Dante complained about the shallow answer the conciliar commission studying this matter gave his objection: “Textus, ordinis generalis, ad casum tam particularem attendere non potest” [the proposed text, of a general order, cannot attend to such a particular case]. And he insisted:
A long catalog can be
made both of popes who were elected without being bishops, and of the acts of government
implemented in the period between the election and the consecration: . . .
Was the Church wrong in believing that those men were supreme pontiffs already
prior to their consecration and that their decisions were valid? . . . (The
Commission) believes that it is enough to appeal to the fact that they had the
will ‘accipiendi consecrationem seu votum
consecrationis’ [to accept the consecration or the desire of the
consecration]. Does this mean that the desire to receive a sacrament, which
confers power, is sufficient to have such power? The answer given by the
Commission is as absurd as saying that a seminarian who has the desire and will
to be ordained a priest can already validly celebrate the Holy Mass by virtue
of his ‘votum ordinationis’ [desire
to be ordained]. . . . (They say) that it will be up to theologians
to try to explain how historical facts can be reconciled with the doctrine of the
Schema. But the problem lies precisely here: Can these facts be reconciled with
this doctrine?[12]
In a 2013 article for Civiltà Cattolica, Gianfranco Ghirlanda, then Professor emeritus of
Canon Law at the Pontifical Gregorian University, created a Cardinal in the
latest consistory, said this traditional doctrine is clearly expressed in
canons 109 and 219 of the 1917 Code of Canon Law, confirmed by Pius XII with
the apostolic constitution Vacantis apostolicae
sedis (1945), with the motu proprio Cleri
sanctitati (1957), and with his speech at the Second International Congress
for the Apostolate of the Laity (1957). The cardinal added: “On this issue,
there have been magisterial and authoritative interventions by at least six
Roman pontiffs between the eleventh and twentieth centuries, which indicate the
acceptance of the election to the supreme pontificate as the moment of
reception by the elected of the supreme and full power over the universal
Church, even if in the perspective of the subsequent episcopal consecration, if
the chosen one was not yet bishop.”[13]
Vatican II innovators were so cognizant of this
obstacle that, when drafting the new Code of Canon Law, they explicitly
stipulated that the new bishop has the right to govern his diocese only after
episcopal consecration unless it is a case of a transfer of see. In the case of
the papal election of a non-bishop, the post-conciliar decrees stipulate that
he be consecrated immediately after accepting the election and before receiving
the act of submission from the cardinals and appearing on the balcony of St.
Peter’s Basilica. Quite differently from Saint Gregory the Great, who ruled for
almost a year as a deacon, and Stephen II and Adrian V, who died without
consecration.
Fr. Umberto Betti, a conciliar expert and later rector
of the Lateran University and cardinal, offered this hesitant explanation for
the historical and canonical precedent contrary to the new doctrine: “It is not
possible to give an answer that is absolutely satisfying. On the doctrinal level,
the solution would consist, perhaps, in saying that God supplies [the power] Himself,
by an anticipated effect of the episcopal consecration to which they are
ordered by an intrinsic necessity from the moment of their election.”[14]
Dr. Lamont has no such hesitations and confidently suggests
an alternative: “This jurisdiction can be explained as papal jurisdiction
supplied to its possessor, which is replaced by properly episcopal jurisdiction
when its possessor is consecrated” (p. 14). But in this hypothesis, the
transitory jurisdiction would not be properly episcopal. It would not be ordinary
but pontifically delegated, like that of any apostolic delegate or apostolic
administrator.. We would then have to conclude that many of the successive prelates
who have governed some of the most important dioceses in Europe should be
removed from the annals because they would not have been real bishops. For
example, many bishops in the dioceses of the Holy Empire’s Prince-Bishops remained
simple tonsured clerics until the end of their lives and obtained from the Holy
See the appointment of a “chor bishop” (a kind of auxiliary bishop) to carry out
on their behalf all activities required by the episcopal munus sanctificandi they did not possess.
In any case, this explanation, for which Dr. Lamont
presented no support in theology or in Church practice, is insufficient to
resolve the penetrating objection Cardinal Dante formulated to Paul VI during
the discussion of the schema on collegiality.
In a forthcoming essay, I will address important underlying issues, such as the philosophical and theological arguments Dr. Lamont presents in favor of the sacramentality of the power of jurisdiction’s origin.
NOTES
[1]
John Lamont, “On the Papal Deposition of Bishops,”
Rorate-caeli.blogspot.com, Dec. 18, 2023, https://rorate-caeli.blogspot.com/2023/12/on-papal-deposition-of-bishops-dr-john.html#more. For the convenience of readers, quotes from Dr.
Lamont’s study are taken from its pdf version (available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JjRjM2hZ-SXzM7d3WON1pxEmPnnhrPfR/view) and only page numbers are shown in this essay.
Original emphases in quotes are always shown using italics. My emphasis in
quotes is always shown in bold.
[2]
José A. Ureta, “Why a Good Bishop Should Not Ignore but Obey His Unjust
Deposition by a Pope,” TFP.org, Oct. 20, 2023, https://www.tfp.org/why-a-good-bishop-should-not-ignore-but-obey-his-unjust-deposition-by-a-pope/
[3]
Fr. Gerald Murray recently published an article titled “Strickland’s
removal was against canon law” (available at https://newdailycompass.com/en/stricklands-removal-was-against-canon-law). He analyses the canonical irregularities incurred
in the procedures to remove these bishops, which would make them invalid. While
his analysis is conclusive and worthy of endorsement, it addresses the issue
from an exclusively canonical rather than a theological perspective in which
the current controversy with Dr. Lamont is being held.
[4]
First Vatican Council, dogmatic constitution Pastor aeternus (July 18, 1870), ch. 3, nos. 1, 6, accessed Feb.
12, 2024, https://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum20.htm.
[5]
Henry Denzinger, The Sources of
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Publications, n.d.), 230 ; Denz.-Rahner 694.
[6]
Pius XII, encyclical Humani
generis (Aug. 12, 1950), no. 20, accessed Feb. 12, 2024, https://www.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_12081950_humani-generis.html.
[7]
Second Vatican Council, dogmatic constitution Lumen gentium, Appendix, accessed Feb. 12, 2024, https://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vatii_const_19641121_lumen-gentium_en.html.
[8]
First Vatican Council, dogmatic constitution Pastor Aeternus (July 18, 1870), ch. 1, no. 1; ch. 3, no. 1; ch. 4,
no 1, end, accessed Feb. 12, 2024, https://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum20.htm.
[9]
Paul VI, Closing Speech (Dec. 7, 1965), accessed Feb. 12, 2024, https://www.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/speeches/1965/documents/hf_p-vi_spe_19651207_epilogo-concilio.html.
[10]
Arnaldo Vidigal Xavier da Silveira, Can
Documents of the Magisterium of the Church Contain Errors? (Spring Grove,
Penn.: The American Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family, and Property,
2015), 28.
[11]
Roberto de Mattei, The Second
Vatican Council: An Unwritten Story, ed. Michael J. Miller, trans. Patrick
T. Brannan, Michael J. Miller, and Kenneth D. Whitehead (Fitzwilliam, N.H.:
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[12]
Albert Kallio, “Collegialità nel Vaticano II: una nuova dottrina?”
Chieseepostconcilio.blogspot.com, June 23, 2018, https://chiesaepostconcilio.blogspot.com/2018/06/collegialita-nel-vaticano-ii-una-nuova.html.
[13]
Gianfranco Ghirlanda, “Cessazione dall’ufficio di Romano Pontefice”, Civiltà Cattolica, quaderno 3905, 2013
v. 1. fn 15, https://www.laciviltacattolica.it/articolo/cessazione-dallufficio-di-romano-pontefice/#_ftnref15
[14]
Kallio, “Collgialità” fn30.
