On April 22, 2017 at the Hotel Columbus in Rome, a block from Saint Peter’s Square, six internationally renowned lay scholars spoke at a landmark conference: "Seeking Clarity: One year after Amoris Laetitia," calling on Pope Francis to answer the dubia of the four cardinals over the passages in Amoris Laetitia that purport to justify acts of adultery, against the Sixth Commandment of the Decalogue, and to allow the reception of Holy Communion by those living in permanent and public adultery more uxorio.
We invite you to read the important interventions from this conference in English by Dr. Anna M. Silvas, "A Year After Amoris Laetitia. A Timely Word" , and by Dr. Douglas Farrow, "The Roots of the Present Crisis" (video).
Additionally, the following is an English translation of the full intervention of Professor Claudio Pierantoni, for the benefit of Rorate's readers:
Claudio Pierantoni
Professor of
Medieval Philosophy
University of Chile
(Chile)
In this
intervention, we will briefly examine the history of two popes of antiquity,
Liberius and Honorius, who, for different reasons, were accused of deviating
from the Tradition of the Church, during the long Trinitarian and
Christological controversy, which consumed the Church from the fourth to the
seventh century.
In the light of the
reactions of the ecclesial body to these doctrinal deviations, we will then examine
the current debate that has developed around the proposals of Pope Francis in
the Apostolic Exhortation "Amoris Laetitia" and the five "dubia" raised by the Four Cardinals.
1. The case of Honorius
We will begin with the case of Honorius I, although chronologically
later, since it is technically clearer. In fact, he was the only pope to
have been formally condemned for heresy. We are in the early decades of
the seventh century, in the context of the controversy over the two wills of
Christ. The Council of Chalcedon, in 451, had affirmed that in the one Person
of Christ are united two complete natures, divine and human; this
solution, however, had left discontented an important part of the Eastern
Churches, who were affirming that, at least after the union, one nature ended
up subsisting in Christ (Monophysitism). In order to meet the unitive needs
of Monophysite faction, Sergius, the patriarch of Constantinople, had therefore
proposed a formula which, while accepting the doctrine of the two natures, counterbalanced
it with the affirmation of the one operational energy of Christ (Monoenergism). Keep
in mind that the empire's political situation was, at that time, very
delicate. The emperor Heraclius, having ascended the throne in 610, had to
confront the massive attack of the Persians, who had invaded large areas of the
Eastern Roman Empire, coming to desecrate the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem and going
even so far as to threaten Constantinople. The emperor, however, managed
to reorganize the Roman forces and lead an epic rescue, which took on the
traits of a true and proper crusade, until finally defeating the Persians in
628. It was natural that, after the war, Heraclitus felt the need for a
religious unification of the Empire and then sought a formula of conciliation
with the Monophysites, who represented the majority of the population in the newly
recaptured provinces. His supporter in this policy was precisely Patriarch
Sergius. This person, then, he made himself the promoter of the doctrine
that whereas, on the one hand, he admitted the two natures in Christ, on the
other hand, he preached His one operating energy. For this doctrine, Sergius
also sought the support of the bishop of Rome Honorius, who, however
(considering perhaps the Greek term enérgheia
unclear or too abstract) preferred to state that in Christ there is only one
will (una voluntas). Pope
Honorius expounded this doctrine in a letter of 634 (Scripta fraternitatis) in response to the Patriarch of
Constantinople (1), and this letter was precisely the cause of his later condemnation
along with Sergius. In 638, with both patriarchs dead, the Emperor
Heraclius promulgated a solemn document of religious union, the "Exposition"
(Ékthesis), in which he
precisely sanctioned the formula of una
voluntas. But in the decades that followed, after another hard
struggle, this formula was definitively declared heretical. In fact, the
doctrine of one will in Christ, or Monothelitism, came to contrast with the
logical consequences of the dogma of the two natures, divine and human, a
doctrine solidly based on biblical revelation, admirably exposited by Pope Leo the
Great and solemnly sanctioned by the Council of Chalcedon. In harmony,
precisely with the Chalcedonian doctrine, finally, in 681, the Third Council of
Constantinople (the Sixth Ecumenical Council), condemned Patriach Sergius and
with him Pope Honorius. Here is the text:
“After having investigated the dogmatic letters written
by Sergius, the former patriarch of the God-protected and imperial city, to
Cyrus, who was at the time the bishop of Phasis, and to Honorius, then pope of
elder Rome, and in like manner also the letter written in reply by that one,
that is, Honorius, to the same Sergius, and after having discovered that these
are entirely alien to the apostolic teachings and to the decisions of the holy
councils and to all the eminent holy Fathers but instead follow the false
teachings of the heretics, these we entirely reject and loathe as
soul-destroying.” (2).
Following the
anathema against Sergius and the other bishops, then the Council concludes:
“We have seen fit to banish from the holy Church of God
and to anathematize also Honorius the former pope of the elder Rome, because we
have discovered the letters written by him to Sergius that he followed in
everything the opinion of that one and confirmed his impious dogma." (3).
The Council was then
ratified by the reigning Pope, Leo II, who having also reiterated the anathema
against his predecessor, with the following words:
“We, in like manner, anathematize the inventors of the
new error: namely, Theodore, Bishop of Pharan, Cyrus of Alexandria, Sergius,
Pyrrhus, Paul, and Peter, betrayers rather than leaders of the Church of
Constantinople, and also Honorius, who did not purify this Apostolic Church by
the doctrine of the apostolic tradition, but rather attempted to subvert the
immaculate faith by profane treason”
Pope Leo II also mentions
this condemnation in two letters: one to the Spanish bishops, stating concerning
Honorius:
"Along with Honorius, who did not immediately
extinguish the flame of heretical teaching, as would befit the apostolic
authority, but supported it by his negligence."
The other letter is
addressed to the Visigoth king of Spain, Ervigius, where it is said that:
"Along with these, Honorius of Rome, who allowed the
immaculate rule of the apostolic tradition that he had received from his
predecessors to be stained".
Now, from the
declarations of the Sixth Ecumenical Council, is obtained a very precise
concept of the unity and coherence that must exist between: (1) the Tradition
received from the Apostles, (2) the definitions of Councils, which reiterate
particular points of the Tradition to clarify them in a solemn manner, and
finally (3) the testimony of the Fathers who, through the centuries, although
without enjoying infallibility, taken individually, however, confirm, with
their consensus, the continuity of a particular teaching. It thus remains
clearly stated, and then explicitly reaffirmed by the same Pope Leo II, that
this body of tradition, formed by the Apostles, Councils, and Fathers, provides
the measuring stick whereby Pope Honorius’ dogmatic statement is evaluated, who,
therefore, although the deceased, is condemned in no uncertain terms by the Constantinopolitan
assembly. Then, the same Pope Leo II ratifies the Council and confirms the
anathema against his predecessor, who strayed from the rule of the Apostolic
tradition; not only, but he also emphasizes the grave responsibility of
Honorius for the negligence with which he favored the spread of the Monothelite
heresy. It is particularly remarkable that the same Roman See, which for
more than two centuries (at least since the time of Damasus) explicitly insisted
on its superiority and prerogative in having the final word, above all in
matters of doctrine, here he decisively highlights the fundamental principle
that the Pope is subject to the rule of the Apostolic Tradition, which he has
received from his predecessors. It is, as the Apostle says, a consignment
(Traditio) or a deposit, which must
first of all be faithfully preserved, to be in turn handed down and taught the
brothers. Honorius is therefore condemned for having permitted the "immaculate rule of the apostolic tradition to
be stained." Therefore, at the center of Pope Leo’s condemnation
of his predecessor figures not his adherence to the wrong formula, which is at
the center of the condemnation of Honorius on the part of the Council, but
also, and I would say above all, the negligence of "permitting the rule of the apostolic tradition to be stained." In fact, taken in itself, the
Honorian formula of "una voluntas"
could also be defended, if it is not intended as referring to natural faculty
of willing, which must necessarily follow the respective nature, but as
referring to the concrete decision taken by the one Person of Christ, in which
evidently the wills, despite being two, human and divine, however converge into
a single action, because Jesus could never disobey the divine will. It is also
probable that how Honorius precisely intended it, albeit perhaps with a certain
mental reservation, conscious, how could he not be, that the formula even so
left the field open to the Monothelite interpretation. What is decisive in
assessing the heretical classification of Honorius is therefore precisely his
negligence in not impeding, or even encouraging, the free diffusion of the
Monothelite heresy.
2. The case of Liberius
Liberius, "natione Romanus", was elected pope
on May 17, 352, in one of the most delicate moments of the Arian
controversy. His predecessor, Julius I, had tenaciously defended the faith
established by the Council of Nicaea in 325, which declared the Son
consubstantial with the Father. Julius had had, in this, the decisive
support of the Emperor of the West, Constantine. But with Constantine
dead, Pope Julius found himself, along with all the bishops of the West, at the
mercy of the pressures of his brother Constantius, Emperor of the East, who
instead supported the majority position of the Eastern episcopate, contrary to
Nicaea. According to the Eastern bishops, in fact, the formula of Nicaea left
no room for the personal difference between the Father and the Son. Left the
only emperor, Constantius was anxious to restore the unity of the Church,
precisely according to the Eastern perspective, contrary to Nicaea. To
this end, he called a council at Arles in 353, in Gaul, which passed over in
silence the faith of Nicea and, in addition, condemned Athanasius, bishop of
Alexandria, the only Eastern bishop who tenaciously defended the formula of “consubstantial.” Even
the legates of the Pope, present at the Council, signed the condemnation of
Athanasius. But Liberius disavowed their work, and asked Constantius to
convene a new council, which would confirm the faith of Nicaea. It was the
Council of Milan in the 355. But here again the bishops loyal to the Pope
failed in their attempt to sign the Nicene Creed, and the condemnation of
Athanasius was repeated again. The three bishops who refused to sign were
deposed and exiled in the East. At this point, the storm was gathering now
around Pope Liberius’ head: in fact, the Pope had not directly participated in
the Council, but the emperor was also well determined to extort his
signature. To this end he sent an emissary with a large sum of money to
offer to the Pope, but he refused it decisively; then the minister
deposited it at St. Peter's tomb as an offering for the Church: but Liberius
had the money thrown out from the church, as a sacrilegious offering. At
this point, the Emperor passed directly to the streets in fact: had Liberius
kidnapped at night, to avoid the resistance of the people, and had him transferred
to Milan, the residence of Emperor of the West at that time. After a
dramatic meeting, in which Liberius did not yield to the pressures of Constantius,
the Pope was deposed and sent into exile in Thrace. We are at the
beginning of 356. Meanwhile, in those years, the doctrinal situation was
further complicated: in particular, the anti-Nicene front split itself into
three parties: (1) those closest to Nicaea were those who considered the Son,
though not equal, at least "similar to the Father in substance" (homoiusiani); (2) those farthest
from Nicea, those who denied any similarity of the Son to the Father (anhómoioi); (3) a middle path then
claimed the party of Homoion (homoioi),
which affirmed a general similarity of the Son to the Father. This last
party was the one closest to the wishes of the emperor, because of its generality,
which, apparently promised to satisfy everyone in a possible union, but a rather
superficial one. This uncertain doctrinal situation, combined with the
cold and the pain of exile in Thrace, unfortunately, began to bend the Pope's resistance,
who, after about a year, ended up yielding. Liberius’ concession is attested
to by four letters handed down by St. Hilary (5). It is also attested to by
St. Athanasius (6) and St. Jerome (7). We know from these documents that
Liberius signed a formula of faith published in a Council of Sirmium: we do not
know if it was the first formula of Sirmium, dating back to 351, which allowed
the faith of Nicaea to fall apart, but at least trying to affirm the closeness
of Son to the Father, or the second formula of Sirmium, of 357, which instead decisively
affirmed the dissimilarity of the Son
from the Father, and additionally forbade the use of “consubstantial” (homousios) and also of “similar according
to substance” (homoiusios). But regardless,
it is clear that Liberius, thus repudiated the faith of Nicaea and went so far
as to excommunicate Athanasius, who was its most important defender. Liberius’
dramatic about-face made a great impression and was severely stigmatized,
especially by St. Hilary. By now docile to the emperor, Liberius after
some time received permission to return to Rome, where he was reinstated as
bishop. Here he was benevolently received by the people, but, now weakened
and wounded in his prestige and in his role of leading the episcopate, he had
neither the strength nor the will to oppose the ultimate realization of
Constantius’ plans, who, in the next double Council of Rimini and Seleucia
(359) finally obtained the triumph of the generic formula of "the Son similar to the Father" by holding
the bishops hostage until they had signed; this formula was later
confirmed in a further council at Constantinople the following year (360): this
formula, with its generality, gave a card of citizenship to the moderate Arian factions,
and, excluding the use of the term ousía
(substance), proscribed both the omoiusiani
as omousiani, that is, the Orthodox
faithful in Nicaea. In the months that followed, all the Arian prelates, as
adept in dialectic as in political dealings, who had made careers thanks to the
favor of Constantius, consolidated their power in the principal episcopal
sees. This is the moment when, according to the famous phrase of St.
Jerome, "the world groaned to find itself Arian." The success of
the ecclesiastical policy tenaciously pursued by Constantius seemed definitive
and the situation appeared stable, for an indeterminate time, in favor of the Arians:
to human eyes, the formula of faith defined at Nicaea 35 years before, seemed
now completely outdated. Of the more than a thousand bishops who accounted
for Christianity, only three remained unshakeable to resist in exile (Athanasius
of Alexandria, Hillary of Poitiers and Lucifer of Cagliari), apparently now cut
off from the course of events.
However, just when
all seemed peaceful, the military situation on the Persian front suddenly
deteriorated, which forced Constantius to take up arms and go to the
East. For more in Gaul, soon after, the army proclaimed the Caesar Julian
as emperor. So, suddenly, the Empire was threatened by external enemies
and at the same time was on the verge of a civil war. This, however, was
providentially avoided, thanks to the sudden death of Constantius by a fever,
November 361: the emperor was just 44 years old.
Having just ascended
the imperial throne, Julian, later called the Apostate, declared war on the
Christian faith and the return of the Roman state to traditional
paganism. This allowed the exiled bishops to return home, and wiped out
with a clean slate, one can say, all the ecclesiastical policy of
Constantius. At this point since the nightmare of the threats of Constantinus
had ceased, Pope Liberius sent out an encyclical that considered the formula
approved at Rimini and Constantinople invalid, and demanded that the bishops of
Italy accept the Nicene Creed. In 366, at a synod held in Rome shortly
before his death, he even had the joy of obtaining the signature of the Nicene
creed from a delegation of the Eastern bishops. Upon his death, he was
revered as a confessor of the faith, but soon his cult was interrupted,
certainly for the memory of his concession, and his name does not appear in the
Roman liturgical memory.
Unlike Honorius,
Liberius received no formal condemnation, certainly due to the fact that, on
the one hand, his defection was due not to a sudden willingness, but to a
strong physical pressure and, on the other hand, when the pressure stopped, the
Pope had the chance to be able to solemnly reaffirm the orthodox faith of
Nicaea. For this reason, even though his moral fault of the concession was
objectively grave, the doctrinal consequences were not so grave because, beyond
the statements extorted out of him, the Pope's mind had remained
orthodox; and on the other hand, a little later the doctrinal situation
was untangled, paradoxically, precisely by Julian’s apostasy.
However, despite
their differences, taken in a general way, the two cases of Liberius and
Honorius have an important point in common, and that is the fact that both their
respective interventions took place while the process of formulating the
respective dogmas was still in progress, the Trinitarian one in the case of
Liberius and the Christological one in the case of Honorius. In fact,
although at Nicaea the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son had been
established dogmatically, a formula was still lacking to define the Trinity of
persons with a technical term; so too, while at Chalcedon the dual nature
of Christ was affirmed, the specification was still lacking that would come
only two centuries later with the formal affirmation of the two
wills. Now, this point that unites the doctrinal deviation of the two
popes of antiquity is undoubtedly their extenuating circumstances; but
unfortunately this same thing is the point that contrasts them to the doctrinal
deviation that is occurring during the current pontificate, which instead has a
strong aggravating factor in his setting himself against doctrines not yet
unclear, or in the process of being formulated, but against doctrines that, in
addition to be firmly anchored in tradition, have also already been
exhaustively debated in recent decades and clarified in detail by the recent Magisterium. So
this is not only a deviation of the Magisterium from Tradition taken in
general, but also a direct contradiction of the pronouncements of the very
recent Magisterium.
3. The case of Francis
Taking into consideration,
therefore, the present case of Pope Francis, the panorama gets considerably
more complicated. Here, naturally, I hardly need to recall the historical
events, which are very recent and well known to the informed public about the
reports that bombard us daily. So I will confine myself to strictly indispensable
points, trying to give an overview of this most serious crisis, which now looms
as the most serious among those ever faced by the Church.
The conflict starts from
a seemingly confined point, which the insufficiently attentive observer tends
to perceive to be a more pastoral and disciplinary interest than a strictly
dogmatic one; that is, the possibility to grant sacramental communion, at least
in certain special cases, to people who cohabitate with a person other than their
legitimate spouse. It is therefore surprising for many that a deviation
from doctrine on this seemingly confined point, is constituting a such a deadly
Trojan horse, capable of triggering, from inside the very edifice of the
Church, a strategic dynamiting of all its defenses and of its own very foundations.
I start by stating
my conviction that that this attack, on a spiritual level, far surpasses the
intentions and subjective consciousness of the supporters of the so-called progressive
line, or more precisely, the modernist one; our struggle, it is good to
keep in mind, is not against persons, "against flesh and blood, but
against principalities and power, against the rulers of the world of this darkness"
(Eph 6:12). But even on a historical level, there is an obligation to report
and not to obscure the fact that this is supported and encouraged by a series
of concrete persons among whom, unfortunately, the person of the Pope stands
out.
Our aim will be,
therefore, to show how, from the particular point of communion for the divorced
and remarried, the discourse is being extended to the entire edifice of
Catholic doctrine by inevitable logical consequence. Naturally, the
doctrinal deviation in question was already present in previous decades and
with it, therefore, even the underground schism that this signifies. But
yet, when one goes from an abuse at the practical level to its justification at
the doctrinal level through a text of the pontifical magisterium and through
positive statements and actions of the same pontiff to support it, the
situation changes radically. Also because the effort to theoretically
justify this position comes necessarily to touch other points of
doctrine. And it happens that the more a theologian, who denies a point of
Tradition, struggles to find arguments to support his thesis, the more he ends
up sinking in the quicksand of contradiction and absurdity. This is because
the Deposit of faith, preserved by the Tradition, is not a system of merely
human, fallible, thought, where an incoherent or erroneous element could be
introduced, which could then be corrected without harm, even to the benefit of
the truth. In the deposit of faith, however, each element is connected to
all the others with infallible consequentiality. Hence that, by struggling
to defend the first error by appealing to other elements, one ends up twisting and
distorting them all.
We see, in four
points, the progress of this destruction.
First point
If marriage is
indissoluble, but yet in some cases communion can be given to the divorced and
remarried, it seems evident that this indissolubility is no longer considered
absolute, but only a general rule that can admit exceptions. Now this, as
Cardinal Caffarra has explained well, contradicts the nature of the sacrament
of marriage, which is not a simple promise, as solemn as it may be, made before
God, but an action of grace that works at the properly ontological level. The action that makes the two become one
flesh has, in fact, a definite character and it cannot be erased. In
addition this action of grace, founded on the very order of creation and
directed towards people’s well-being, as the sacrament assumes the function of
signifying the indissoluble union between Christ the Bridegroom and His
Church. If the sacrament of the Eucharist makes present in our midst the
sacrifice of Christ, by which the Redeemer is inseparably united to the
mystical body of His bride the Church, for its part the sacrament of marriage
is not only a symbol, but also concretely realizes a visible and real representation
of this mystery: it is at the same time, sign and reality.
Therefore,
when it is said that marriage is indissoluble, what is stated is not simply a
general rule, but what is said is that ontologically marriage cannot be
dissolved, because in it is contained the sign and the reality of the
indissoluble marriage between God and his People; and this this mystical
marriage, it will be useful to remember it, is precisely the end of the whole
divine plan of Creation and Redemption.
Second point
We can observe that the author of Amoris
Laetitia, albeit in a manner not entirely clear, is aware that His proposal
is vulnerable in this aspect. In fact, numerous attempts to put the
tradition of indissolubility into doubt have also recently been refuted both on
the biblical and patristic levels and on the dogmatic one (8). Therefore, the author
has instead chosen to insist instead, in his argumentation, on the subjective
side of moral action. The subject, he says, may not be able to be in mortal sin
because, for various reasons, he is not fully aware that his situation
constitutes adultery. Now this, which in
general terms can certainly happen, in the use that our text makes of it
instead involves an evident contradiction. In fact, here all
the discourse is centered on the need for discernment of individual situations
and on accompaniment to offer people. In fact, it is clear that precisely
the discernment and accompaniment of individual situations directly contrast
with the supposition that the subject remains, for an indefinite time, unaware
of his situation. And the author, far from perceiving this contradiction,
pushes it to the further absurdity of affirming that a profound discernment can
lead the subject to have the certainty that his situation, objectively contrary
to the divine law, is precisely what God wants from him. That is, the subjective element of ignorance, which can
certainly diminish responsibility in many cases, here paradoxically is
transformed into an element of knowledge, on the basis of which the subject can
come to establish with certainty that God wants him to behave objectively
contrary to His own law, that law which emanates from His eternal and
infallible Wisdom.
Third point
Recourse
to the previous argument, in its turn, betrays a dangerous confusion that in
addition to the doctrine of the sacraments goes so far as to undermine the very
notion of the Divine Law. On this point, we must above all point out that
here a merely positive divine disposition is not at stake, as can be the laws
governing incidental aspects of the cult, which, as such, are adapted to
different historical circumstances: for example, the dietary laws of the Jews,
laws on blood sacrifices, or the same circumcision. At stake here,
however, is the law of God understood as the source of the natural law, reflected in the
Ten Commandments. This is given to man because
it is suited to governing his fundamental behaviors, not limited to particular
historical circumstances, but founded on his very nature, whose author is precisely
God. To serve as a simple comparison for us: the positive
law that governs the movement of a car in a certain country is one thing; the
instruction booklet written by the vehicle manufacturer is another thing. If
I exceed a speed limit for a vital emergency, let us suppose, I can also be
morally justified, because the rule, while just in itself, however, is not
absolute, because it is not intrinsically linked to the essence of the
vehicle. If I contravene the directive of the manufacturer, who tells me
that the car was designed to run on gasoline, no emergency or exception, certainly
no discernment will serve to ensure that the car could run with diesel. To
use diesel is not therefore a bad thing because it is "forbidden" by
some external law, but it is intrinsically irrational, because it contradicts
the very nature of the vehicle. Therefore, to suppose that
the natural law may admit exceptions is a true and proper contradiction, it is
a supposition that does not understand its true essence and therefore confuses
it with positive law. The presence of this grave confusion is confirmed by the
repeated attack, present in Amoris
Laetitia against the petty legalists, the presumed “Pharisees” who are
hypocrites and hard of heart. This attack, in fact, betrays a complete misunderstanding
of the position of Jesus toward the Law, because His criticism of pharisaic
behavior is based precisely on a clear distinction between positive law (the
“precepts of men”) to which the Pharisees are so attached, and the fundamental
Commandments, which are instead the first requirement, indispensable, that he
himself asks of the aspiring disciple. On the basis of this equivocation one
understands the real reason why, after having so greatly insulted the Pharisees,
the pope ends up, de facto, aligning
himself with their own position in favor of divorce, against that of Jesus.
But, even more
deeply, it is important to observe that this confusion profoundly distorts the
very essence of the Gospel and its necessary grounding in the person of Christ.
Fourth point
Christ,
in fact, according to the Gospel, is not simply a good man who came into the
world to preach a message of peace and justice. He is, first of all, the Logos,
the Word who was in the beginning and who, in the fullness of time, becomes
incarnate. It is significant that the insistence of Pope John Paul II on the
objectivity of the moral law, affirmed in VS (1993), is then completed with its
necessary foundation in rational truth, which, in turn, is referred to as the
presupposition of faith (FR, 1998). And it is also very significant that
then also his successor, Benedict XVI, right from his homily “Pro eligendo romano
pontifice,” made precisely the Logos the linchpin of his teaching, showing clearly
that the origin of the modern attack on the faith is carried out precisely on
philosophical presuppositions, therefore, precisely on the doctrine of
the Logos, a doctrine not by coincidence fought to
the death with the subjectivism of modern theories of knowledge.
It is clear, that
the ethical subjectivism can only find space within a subjectivist or
immanentist epistemology. If the object of the human mind, in fact, is not
based in the final analysis on the transcendent Truth that illuminates it,
which is the same Truth by which things come into existence, then the mind cannot
truly know things, and its concepts are empty formalities which cannot reflect
reality.
Now,
in the realm of this subjectivist philosophy one of the postulates most dear to
Pope Francis is justified, according to which “Realties are more important than
ideas.” A maxim like this, in fact, makes sense only in a vision in which there
cannot exist true ideas that not only faithfully reflect reality but can even
judge and direct it. If instead we
accept, with the Christian tradition, that the Word of God is the eternal
Wisdom which, on one hand, creates the world and, on the other hand, illuminates
the human mind, then we must accept that in this eternal wisdom there is precisely
an Idea, a Model, which is superior to historical reality, an Idea that governs
reality, created in its intimate structure and gives it the law in its deepest
sense; and that this Wisdom, if it is such, is also able to effectively
communicate that knowledge to the intelligent creature who has formed similar
to himself, because it can know him and love him. The Gospel, then,
taken as a whole, presupposes this metaphysical and epistemological structure,
where the Truth is in the first place the conforming of things to the intellect,
and the Intellect is in the first place the divine one: indeed, the divine
Word.
So it is on the same
divine Word that is based the importance, in the Christian message, of the
"right doctrine" since doctrine, expressed in concepts, far from
being a mere formality emanated by the human intellect, is instead precisely a
reflection of the Word both in its philosophical aspect, as a theory of knowledge
and rational theology, and in its historical aspect, as the Tradition that
comes to us from the coming of Christ on earth. That is why, in the
heretical tendency that Amoris Laetitia
demonstrates, above all if read in light of many other statements of the Pope
and of his closest collaborators, the attack on reason and the natural law is
accompanied by the attack carried out on the historical tradition of Jesus.
Since in his divine nature, Christ is the Truth, rather the Truth indeed, he became
man in Christ. Therefore, the attack carried out on the Truth destroys at
the same time the historical truth of Christ, which is also the principle truth
of all history; with that, therefore, it so much destroys the ontological
truth as far as the truth and historical visibility of the Church, of its
Tradition and of its Sacraments, which constitute the purpose and the effect of
the coming of Christ.
Hence, the error of this attitude consists not only and not so much in
denying one or even more specific points of Catholic doctrine, but precisely in
discrediting the very nature of “doctrine” itself and its necessary link with
the reason. In fact, if "realities are more important than ideas,"
to lose relevance is not only a doctrine, but doctrine itself. In the
beginning is not the Logos, but the Praxis. "Im Anfang war die Tat," "In the beginning was the Action," as Dr. Faust said, retranslating
the Gospel. In this atmosphere it can be understood how it is possible
that the editor of “La Civiltà Cattolica”
could state that it is pastoral practice that must guide doctrine, and not vice-versa,
and that in theology “two plus two can equal five.” It explains why a Lutheran
lady can receive communion together with her Catholic husband: the practice, in
fact, the action, is that of the Lord’s Supper, which they have in common,
while where they differ is only “the interpretations, the explanations,” mere
concepts after all. But it also explains how, according to the superior general
of the Society of Jesus, the incarnate Word is not capable of coming into
contact with his creatures through the means that he himself chose, the
apostolic Tradition: in fact, it would be necessary to know what Jesus truly
said, but we cannot, he says, “since at the time there was no tape recorder.” The general is not in
the least touched by the reflection that, if the Eternal Wisdom had thought
that a tape recorder was the most suitable means to make us know His words, I
would have certainly chosen it. And, with the conceit of homo tecnologicus, he comes to tell us
that a machine, an inanimate being, would be a more efficacious means than the
living tradition of human beings, which passes through the heart and faith of
the Apostles and their successors, who were personally chosen by Him for this
very purpose.
Even more deeply,
in this atmosphere, it is finally explained why the pope cannot answer “yes” or
“no” to the dubia. If, in fact
“realities are more important than ideas,” then man does not even need to think
with the principle of non-contradiction, he has no need of principles that say
“this yes and this no” and must not even obey a transcendent natural law, which
is not identified with reality itself. In short, man does not need a doctrine,
because the historical reality suffices for itself. It is the “Weltgeist,” the Spirit of the World.
4.
Conclusion
To conclude, from
the comparison of the current situation with that of previous "heretical
popes", emerges a similarity, but also a clear difference. The
similarity is given by the fact that in all three cases, at the end, what is
being sought is a compromise formula, a political solution that can collect the
greater number of consensus votes, but without deepening its truth content and
its consistency with Tradition. History shows that these attempts are
doomed to failure, because the subsequent development of reflection inevitably makes
the contradictions come to the surface which were tried to be concealed.
The essential
difference which we note between the ancient and the modern situation is
instead the following. Without taking anything away, neither the severity of
the ancient Trinitarian and Christological controversies, nor the drama of the
events that involved Liberius and Honorius, nor their responsibilities,
however, in comparison with the current situation, their doctrinal deviations appear
limited to particular points, albeit very important ones, and were derived in
large part, much less from the heretical minds of the Pontiffs, than from the
political pressures and from a theological terminology still on the path of
formulation.
What instead leaps
to the attention in the current situation is precisely the underlying doctrinal
deformation that, as skillful as it may be in evading directly heterodox
formulations, still maneuvers in a coherent way to carry forward an attack not
only against particular dogmas like the indissolubility of marriage and the
objectivity of the moral law, but even against the very concept of right
doctrine, and with it, of the very person of Christ as Logos. The first victim
of this doctrinal deformation is precisely the pope, who I hazard to conjecture
is hardly aware of this, a victim of a generalized epochal alienation from
Tradition, in large segments of theological teaching; after him, there are innumerable
victims who fall into deception.
In this situation, the
"dubia", these five
questions submitted by the Four Cardinals, were certainly a fundamental turning
point, a powerful light of truth that has been cast on this chaos, and for this
we must thank them deeply. Though they are few and apparently isolated,
their questions are still courageous statements of truth. In fact, they
are not the only ones who speak, but the same Logos, "from whose mouth
comes a sharp sword." (Rev. 19:15). Now, these five questions have
put the Pope in a stalemate. If he were to answer them by denying the Tradition
and the Magisterium of his predecessors, he would pass to being formally
heretical, so he cannot do it. If instead he were to answer them in
harmony with the previous Magisterium, he would contradict a great part of the doctrinally
relevant actions taken during his pontificate, so it would be a very difficult
choice. He, therefore, chose silence because, humanly speaking, the
situation can appear to have no way out. But in the meantime, the confusion
and the de facto schism extend throughout
the Church.
In
the light of all this, it therefore becomes more necessary than ever, as initially
provided for at least by Cardinal Burke, to make a further act of courage,
truth, and charity, on the part of the Cardinals, but also of the Bishops and
then of all the qualified laity who would like to adhere to it. In such a
serious situation of danger for the faith and of generalized scandal, it is not
only licit, but even obligatory for an
inferior to fraternally correcting his superior, always done in charity; even
the hierarchical or religious obedience can be used, in this case of general
danger, as an excuse to silence the truth.
In short, a
fraternal correction frankly addressed to Peter is necessary, for his good and
that of the whole Church.
Some, with regard to
this fraternal correction put forth to the Pope, have expressed the fear that
it could lead to a formal schism. But on reflection, this fear proves to
be entirely unfounded. In fact, all the conditions are lacking for formal
schism. There is no record, to begin with, that any of the Cardinals would
want to hold that Francis is not the Pope, and even less, that someone wants to
get himself elected anti-pope. The true schism, which is increasing every
day, is rather a de facto one, that
only a correction may restrain.
A fraternal
correction, in the end, is neither an act of hostility, nor a lack of respect,
nor an act of disobedience. It is nothing other than a declaration of truth: caritas in veritate. The pope, even
before being pope, is our brother, and this is therefore a primordial duty of
charity towards him. We will be called to account for his destiny, as well
as that of all those who rely on his guidance. The wicked man, God says
through the prophet Ezekiel, "will die for his sin," but if you,
watchman, do not warn him, "I will require an account from you of his
death" (Ezek. 33.8).
Christian Brothers:
Cardinals, Bishops, Priests, professors, friends all. Christ came into the
world "to bear witness to the Truth" (Jn 18:37). We just have
to follow him, bearing witness to the truth; not tomorrow, but today, "while
the day lasts" (Jn 11:9). The time is now, "he lowered the
sails" (1 Cor 7:29).
Rome. April 22,
2017
*
(1) Denzinger 487.
(2) 13th Session
(Denzinger 550).
(3) Denzinger 552.
(4) Letter Regi Regum to the Emperor Constantine
IV (Denzinger 563).
(5) In Collectanea Antiariana Parisina.
(6) In Collectanea Antiariana Parisina.
(7) De viris illustribus 97.
(8) Cf. R. Dodaro,
ed., Remaining in the Truth of Christ,
2014.
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