Roberto de Mattei
Corrispondenza Romana
February 28, 2018
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Among the staunchest opponents of the Vatican Ostopolik, a figure of remarkable cultural and moral stature should be remembered: Father Alessio Ulisse Floridi (1930-1986).
A member of the Company of Jesus at a very young age, Father Floridi studied
at the Pontifical Russian College, where he learned Russian perfectly and, in
1949, he was ordained a priest in the Byzantine Rite His hope was to be part of an underground
apostolate in Russia, just like some of his confreres, but his superiors wanted
him at La Civiltà Cattolica, the journal which was the pride and joy of the
Company. Father Floridi became the sovietologist par excellence of this
journal, collaborating with articles written
from first-hand reading of newspapers, journals and documents coming [directly]
from the Soviet Union. His articles rich
in notes and personal comments, were read and appreciated for their accuracy by
the Communists themselves, both in Italy and abroad.
The election of John XXIII and the calling of the Second Vatican Council were
a turning point in the lives of the writers at La Civiltà Cattolica. In the
obituary written for Father Floridi, on December 20 1986, the Jesuit journal writes
that he had left La Civiltà Cattolica because the life of a writer was too “static
and sedentary”. In reality, as Father
Floridi informed me personally, he was abruptly liquidated for not bending to
his superiors’ impositions. They had asked him to apply the St. Francis de
Sales maxim to Communism, “a spoonful of honey attracts more flies than a barrel of vinegar”. The same discourse had been made to Father
Giovanni Caprile (1917-1993), who, on the other hand, had accepted the
suggestion, and from being an implacable critic, he became an apologist for Freemasonry.
Father Floridi recalled that the Jesuit vow of obedience was not indiscriminate,
as many suppose, but simply obliges: “to
go wherever His Holiness sends them among the faithful and the infidels.”
(Constitution § 7). And he didn’t back off when,
from high places, it was decided he should be sent as far away as possible from
Villa Malta, the headquarters of La Civiltà
Cattolica in Rome. So he ended up first in Brazil, among the Russian
refugees, and afterwards, in the United States, where he lead a fruitful
mission among Ukrainian Catholics of the Oriental Rite, without ever giving in
to the new trend.
When I met him in 1977, Father Floridi was an imposing fifty-seven year
old, with a black beard framing his open, jovial, good-humored face, typical of
authentic “Romani de Roma ”. In
1976 he published the book Moscow and
the Vatican for La Casa Matriona, afterwards translated into various languages
and which is still a text of capital reference for the study of the relations
between the Vatican and the Kremlin. On
November 28th 1977, he gave an extensive interview to the monthly, Cristianità, which I will reproduce here in its entirety. Re-reading it, it
seems to me that his historical analysis helps us understand in-depth the Ostpolitik
of both yesterday and today (On the
Theme of Dissent and Ostpolitik, in Cristianità, 32 (1977). Pp. 3-4).
The Interview
Q. The slant of the volume you dedicated to Moscow and the Vatican is unusual.
It carries as a subtitle: The Soviet Dissidents Faced with “Dialogue”. The
politics of “the easing of tensions”[détente]between the Holy See and the Kremlin,
appraised, that is to say, by Soviet dissent. What is the reason for your
interest in “the Soviet dissidents”?
It’s very simple. I have continuously studied the Soviet Union and “The
Soviet Man”, a man whose nature is no different
from ours, despite the “unnaturalness” of the regime in which he lives. As a
result I [began] to realize that there was something happening in this world,
which was starting to produce a reaction.
Q. Is this reaction limited to a cultural elite or does it extend to the
Soviet people? There is in fact, the suspicion that it is not a sufficiently deep-rooted
phenomenon, but almost a cultural “fashion”…
R. The phenomenon is absolutely not limited to an intellectual elite. The
religious dissent especially, is diffused in large segments of the population.
I’m thinking, for example, of the Ukrainian and Lithuanian Catholics, the
Baptists, the underground Orthodox Church, the followers of Father Dudko, or
even what is happening in Poland, where dissent is growing and spreading among
the workers. It should be said, however, that the reality of dissent doesn’t
always coincide necessarily with the image that is projected in the West. In fact, only a certain kind of dissent is
known in the West, the one which is filtered through intellectual channels.
Whereas much less is known about the reality of the religious dissent of the
peoples.
Q. So then, what is the judgment of the “dissidents” with regard to the “dialogue” between Moscow
and the Vatican?
R. Extremely negative. The dissidents have no trust whatsoever in this
dialogue of which they actually experience the consequences. They should be the
beneficiaries of these politics of détente but they are in fact its victims.
Let me add that it seems inconceivable to me that, from the Catholic part there
is this desire to cast a shadow of diffidence and suspicion over them. I’m
referring to an article by one of my Swiss confreres, Father Hotz, which
appeared in La Civiltà Cattlolica and
which, for that matter, was brilliantly refuted by your journal. To me it seems paradoxical that while the
dissidents are entreating Western Catholics to distrust this dialogue, it is
precisely the Catholics in the West who are inviting suspicion and distrust of
the dissidents.
Q. What are the Kremlin’s interests in this “dialogue”?
Through dialogue the Soviet Union attains the Vatican’s silence. And this
silence weakens the internal and external opposition to the Communist regime,
thus contributing to the consolidating of the Soviet empire’s internal
positions and favoring its international expansion. It’s clear that Moscow
seeks support from Rome to increase its “credibility” on the international
level. The more a détente is sought the
more internal tensions are intensified.
Q. In your view, on the other hand, what are the motives impelling the Vatican to
seek “dialogue” with the Kremlin?
R. Here the question is more complex. I’d say that we can identify at least
two strategic lines. The first is diplomatic, of concordat, and aims at
attaining a modus vivendi between the Vatican and the Communist State with the
goal of safeguarding international “peace” as well as the Catholic ecclesial
structure in the Soviet empire’s territories. The Vatican prefers, then, to
ignore the underground Church, which has been conducting a heroic apostolate
behind the Iron Curtain, to establish
new types of relations “in the open” with the Communist authorities.
This means, for example, that Catholic bishops must have the Soviet “placet”
for their nomination. This strategy is under the direction of Archbishop
Casaroli and his Secretariat. Casaroli himself drew up a sufficiently explicit
program in his discourse on The Holy See and Europe, delivered in Milan on
January 20th 1972.
Q. You mentioned a second policy…
R. Yes, it’s the one I’d call “ecumenical”, which is under the direction of
the Secretariat for the Unity of Christians, headed by Cardinal Willebrands. We
are talking here about “ecumenical dialogue”
between the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Patriarchy of Moscow.
It was Willebrands himself, then Secretary of the Secretariat, who “ held discussions”
(during a sojourn in Moscow – September
27 - October 2 1962) about the
participation of the Russian Orthodox as observers at the Second Vatican
Council.
The Russian representatives, were,
in fact, the first Orthodox observers present in Rome right from the inauguration
of the Council on the evening of October
11th. In fact, at this
precise moment there is an Orthodox delegation at the [Collegium] Russicum - here – as usual – on pilgrimage. An ANSA communiqué specifies that the
“meetings” take place in the ambit of periodic exchange visits between the Holy
See and the Russian Orthodox Church, in coincidence with the visit of a Vatican
delegation to the Patriarchy of Moscow. The Second Vatican Council was, thus, the
historical “turning point” in the course of relations between the Church of
Rome and the Patriarchy of Moscow, characterized, up until then, by a violent
anti-Catholic stance.
Q. In your view, what are the reasons for this turnaround?
R. We mustn’t forget the link of the close collaboration and direct dependence
of the Patriarchy of Moscow on the Kremlin. And it’s certain that, on the part
of the Kremlin, there was keen interest in
blocking any eventual attempt of the Council in condemning Communism officially.
There were no lack of opportunities for the Russian guests to make clear that
silence on the question of Communism was a
sine qua non for the continuance of their presence in Rome. The Russian
Orthodox Church relaxed their “reserve” about the Council only after it
appeared clear that the Council would not have condemned Communism.
Q. What are the “obstacles” the Holy See faces in its “ ecumenical dialogue”
with the Patriarchy of Moscow?
R. A principal one is created today by the troublesome presence of six
million Ukrainian Catholics determined to remain faithful to their religious,
historical and cultural tradition. The Holy See doesn’t want to recognize the
Ukrainian Patriarchy - the only way to keep the Ukrainian Catholic Church alive
in the nation and abroad - because the Orthodox Church of Moscow calls for the
suppression of the Ukrainian Catholics. The Vatican today has greater regard
for the schismatic Metropolitan Bishops Nikodim and Pimen than for the Catholic
Patriarch Slipyi.
Q. Why this close relationship between the Kremlin and the Patriarchy of
Moscow?
R. The Patriarchy of Moscow carries out two main functions. The first,
internal, is as a filter function, a buffer. It consists of keeping the
faithful subject to the Communist regime; the second, external, consists in
convincing the heads of the other Christian Churches that Communism is in the end
not as bad as it is depicted, and in crediting it, on the contrary, for its
“effort” towards peace in the world. Significant, in this regard, is the
function carried out by the Orthodox Church of Moscow inside the World Council
of Churches which has refused to support the peaceful Soviet dissidents,
whereas it doesn’t withhold its support of the “dissidents” - for the most part
terrorists - in other Western countries.
Q. Don’t you think that the Kremlin considers the developments of its relations
with the Vatican in a similar perspective?
R. Certainly. In Communist countries where a diplomatic relationship or a
concordat is established, the governing authorities give their consent to the
nomination of the bishops, on the condition that these accept all of Soviet law, including, evidently, the
part regarding religion. In this way the government unloads the odious burden
of having to respect iniquitous laws onto the ecclesiastic authorities. Today a
zealous priest who teaches catechism is often punished by his bishop, before he
is by the civil authorities.
Q. How do the faithful react to this dramatic situation?
R. The faithful behind the Curtain, find themselves faced with real crises
of conscience. Generally they solve
them, by choosing the hard but courageous road of resistance to the
ecclesiastic authorities. This is
perhaps the most interesting aspect of the phenomenon: the spreading of dissent
from the civil sphere against the ecclesiastic sphere. It is happening in
Hungary, in Czechoslovakia and in Lithuania. More than a hundred Lithuanian
priests have asked the Holy Father to stay without a bishop rather than
betraying the mandate of Christ.
Q. Do you also consider a modus vivendi between the Soviet State and the
Vatican impossible?
R. I fear that the Vatican has forgotten something confirmed also by the
dissidents at the Sacharov conferences, which is that the Soviet State wants
the destruction of every religion and hence the Catholic religion too. I don’t
see, then, what elements there could be to base a modus vivendi between the
Catholic Church and atheistic Communism.
Q. What do you think of the thesis that says a hardening of the Vatican
might put international peace at risk?
R. We have always been taught since childhood what is contained in the
Catechism: that God should be placed before everything else and that it would
be better for the world to perish, rather than commit a sin, an offense against
God. A nuclear catastrophe, then would be less grave than a single mortal sin.
This faith seems to be shrinking in the ecclesiastic authorities, obsessed with a search for peace
at any cost. The salvation of human
lives seems preferable to them than the violation of God’s rights. This is a
very grave problem and the solution to it rests with the theologians, the
bishops and the Pope. To them I pose this interrogative. This stance, which makes
its own, the teaching of St. Peter “We ought to obey God rather than men”
(Acts, 5, 29). justifies, I believe religious dissent.
Father Alessio Ulisse Floridi died prematurely on November 7th 1986, in the
Regina Apostolorum clinic of Albano (Rome), after unexpected complications
following surgery. The nuns at the
clinic were edified by how he faced his illness. Today we call on him as a ‘witness
to the prosecution’ against “the sell-out” of the Chinese Church to the
Communist regime by Pope Francis and Cardinal Parolin.
Translation: Contributor Francesca Romana
