This is the first of several analyses written for Rorate by our contributor Serre Verweij on Leo XIV's first year.
Series: The First Year of Leo XIV
I - LEO AND THE GERMANS
While we are waiting for Pope Leo XIV to tip his hand and release his first encyclical, and make his first curial appointments, both sides in the struggle between tradition and modernism keep trying to claim him. The attempts by progressives to claim the Pope as their secret candidate (after the fact) are looking increasingly desperate, however. Specifically, attempts by the German bishops stand out as highly dubious.
After Pope Leo was elected, German bishops tried to equate Prevost’s past support for the word "synodality" with openness to their heretical Synodal Way project, though even Pope Francis always clearly distinguished the two. Specifically, Cardinal Marx suddenly came out and claimed he lobbied for Prevost privately -- but, unlike reports of Burke and Prevost meeting, sources did not claim this during the conclave, only afterwards. Additionally, Marx has made both assumptions and claims regarding Cardinal Prevost’s and now Pope Leo’s stances which deserve a thorough analysis, as the scandals and heresies from Germany have caused global concern amongst Catholics for more than a decade.
Stories of cardinal Marx
Pope Leo XIV recently unambiguously affirmed mandatory celibacy both for bishops and for priests. He did this very early in his papacy and it was mentioned across Catholic media outlets and even in a couple of secular ones. Yet, Cardinal Marx claimed that married priests would still be an open question. He asserted that he does not think ‘Pope Leo is set in his ways’. This implicitly acknowledges Pope Leo’s current ways are opposing optional celibacy and upholding the apostolic discipline. But Marx claims the Pope’s views on this issue can change. Why? Not because of anything Pope Leo or Cardinal Prevost has said or done, privately or publicly, but because according to Marx Prevost “has basic experience, especially in Latin America." This ‘basic experience in Latin America, from 1982 till 1999 (with a few interruptions) and from 2015 till 2023 ended with him having ‘his ways’ in 2025 and supporting priestly celibacy. How the same decades of experience that ended with Pope Leo supporting priestly celibacy would make him open to revising his views on that very issue, Marx failed to adequately explain. This calls his reliability regarding Leo on other points into question, too.
When Marx spoke positively of Pope Leo after his election, and suggested he had supported Cardinal Prevost’s candidacy, he also claimed that it had in fact been Prevost who, as prefect of the Dicastery of Bishops, ‘saved’ the German Synodal Way through a ‘compromise formula’. This is an interesting claim as in his more recent interview where he claimed openness on celibacy, Marx did the same on synodality, yet actually watered down the original German proposals, indicating that not even Germany would get a full democratic Assembly, that the hierarchy of bishops as apostolic successors would remain and that bishops could not be told how to govern their diocese by any future synodal body.
This surprising statement from Marx is consistent with recent developments of the Synodal Path and the discussed plans for a future synodal body. No longer called a synod council, it is now said that whatever final form a future synodal body in Germany takes, it will “make fundamental decisions on pastoral planning and future issues of the Church of supradiocesan importance,” and advise “on financial and budgettary matters of the Catholic Church in Germany that are not decided at diocesan level.”
If it cannot control diocesan funds, nor make doctrinal decisions for Germany, its authority and scope will be rather limited, especially now the previously mentioned recent statements by Cardinal Marx suggest even this alleged authority for pastoral planning will be rather limited when it comes to how bishops actually run their dioceses.
Questions upon questions
So what did Prevost save exactly? A watered down synodal body that will not be a force with control? A council which will not be equal to the episcopal conference or control what bishops do in their diocese? What is even the basis for the assertion that Prevost would have ensured this compromise formula? How would the Germans know that he was responsible for it? If this is inferred based on the personnel changes that took place in the Curia in 2023, would not Fernandez seem more like the obvious suspect?
Or was Prevost’s role in this compromise known to the Germans bishops who attended, as well as all the curial prefects present? Was the newly appointed and generally reserved and quiet listener Prevost openly taking sides and playing a key role in one of the most contentious Church disputes, that of the last five years, while he was rather nuanced and hands off regarding everything else? This also managed to not get leaked at all including during the general congregations and the conclave?
Prevost saving the German Synodal Path suggests it was close to being killed by the Vatican. How and when was this the case? This did not get reported, quite the opposite, actually. Does Marx get his story, that Prevost saved the Synodal Path from an imminent demise, from the same source where he got his story that Pope Leo is not clear on priestly celibacy?
Was the implication here that Francis, after having been rather inactive regarding the Synodal Path for years (and even having distanced himself from Parolin’s letter criticizing it more thoroughly in 2022), suddenly decided to take a hard line against the Germans and discipline them in a way he had never done before, only for Prevost to talk him out of it? How would the Germans even know about that? Is Marx implying Prevost promised to talk to Francis?
Or does he mean Prevost pushed for the compromise formula in 2024 and this was different from Ouellet’s previous approach? While this is not completely implausible, it is still telling that this alleged different approach of Prevost compared to his predecessor was not commented on by any German bishops or media, nor any other Vatican watchers at the time.
Since the so called compromise formula entailed the Germans throwing many of the more radical attacks on episcopal authority under the bus, Prevost could have only saved the Synodal Path if the Germans had felt close to being forced to cancel the project altogether. Does the record sequence of events bear this out?
Setting the historical record straight
The Germans launched the radical Synodal Path in 2019, claiming to base themselves on studies into abuse and abuse coverups in the German church and a desire to address these issues. Certain progressive German bishops, specifically Marx, had in fact been criticized for trying to influence what was supposed to be an independent study into abuse and trying to steer it towards specific progressive conclusions.
Pope Francis warned them against pursuing a bureaucratic and ideological path and encouraged them to instead focus on evangelization in 2019, but the German bishops pressed on regardless. Conservative Vatican prelates such as Cardinal Ouellet in his role as prefect of the Dicastery of Bishops and Cardinal Koch as prefect of the Dicastery of Christian Unity spoke out against the radical proposals in Germany too, but were likewise ignored. Vatican attempts at intervention were expected to be unlikely to succeed, unless Francis himself was willing to back a more firm response, which few thoughts he would do.
Worse, Francis announced his own Synod on Synodality, and many modernists hoped, while conservatives feared, that it would enable the Rhine to flow into the Tiber with at least some German proposals being (partially) accepted. This was made worse by the fact that Francis had appointed the radically liberal Cardinal Hollerich from Luxembourg as relator general of the Synod, while the secretary of the Synod, Cardinal Grech from Malta, was a liberal who became or revealed himself to be radical, as well, and pro-German from 2022 onwards. Hollerich increasingly revealed the extent of his radical views, in early 2022 suggesting that the Catholic teachings on the sinfulness of homosexuals acts were outdated.
This may have been the final straw that motivated four cardinals and about 70 bishops from all continents to organize a formal ‘dubia’ aimed at the German Synodal Path, in which they strongly defended Church doctrine, with two more cardinals (including the heroic Cardinal Zen) and 30 more bishops joining later on. This came on top of ‘dubia’ from the Scandinavian bishops (including Cardinal Arborelius) and open criticism by the Polish bishops’ conference. Cardinal Pell said he expected Pope Francis to act and Cardinal Ranjith expressed similar sentiment. Yet, Francis would remain silent throughout 2022.
Parolin takes a stand
Finally, in the summer of 2022, Cardinal Parolin, the very powerful Secretary of State, who was a Francis appointee and not previously known as a conservative, finally took a stand and sent the aforementioned letter which rejected the authority of the Synodal Path. It was (deliberately?) unsigned and as a result reported in the media as simply being a letter from the Vatican, which gave it even greater weight.
However, Francis would soon mention in an interview that it was from Parolin and that it should have been signed (though he hand-waved it as a forgivable mistake) and distanced himself from it, referring back to his ignored 2019 letter as his final word on it. At the ad liminia visit in November 2022 the German bishops kept being evasive and recalcitrant.
‘German Catholic Bishops Face Vatican Critics, Refuse to Stop Questioning Church Teachings’ was how The Wall Street Journal described the situation on November. 19, 2022. Later, on March 1 2023, Cruxnow reported that ‘German bishops apparently ignore Vatican veto’. Ouellet achieved not submission, nor even a compromise in the Vatican’s favour.
Still, in January of 2023, another letter from Parolin, this time co-signed by Ouellet and Ladaria, insisted the Germans cease their heretical and uncanonical project. Parolin claimed to be acting with the support of Pope Francis (yet again the letter lacked his signature), meaning he likely either successfully pressured Francis into agreeing to it, with the help of two old outgoing conservative prefects who had little to lose, or that he was daring Francis to correct him a second time and call him a liar, with the help of two outgoing conservatives who had little to lose.
When Ouellet got on board with Parolin’s attempts to call the Germans to order in late 2022, they were still ignored. Ouellet’s call for a moratorium was specifically rejected as well. The Germans refused to agree even to a pause of their Synodal Way. let alone to pulling the plug on it. The joint letter in January of 2023 did not get the Germans to fold, either.
While Ouellet had been critical of the Germans on his own initiative, he did eventually join with Parolin who spearheaded most major clashes in this area. Would Prevost have really attempted to influence or contradict the powerful Parolin, and not purely privately, but in a way where others knew, so early in his term as prefect?
Why would the Germans have feared Ouellet when he was past the retirement age? Seeing how the German successfully ignored him and Parolin well into 2023, when Ouellet was due to turn 79, it seems they had won the waiting game?
Now, after the conclave, we suddenly get the news that the German Path was in real danger of being stopped by the Vatican in the final days, that Prevost prevented this through a compromise formula and that this was successfully kept secret.
Enter Prevost
At the end of January it was announced that Prevost would replace Ouellet in April of 2023. Prevost was rather unknown at the announcement and the subsequent appointment led to little to no response. Bishop Bätzing did shrug of opposition of Cardinal Roche to broadly allowing lay preaching.
The first Vatican action with regards to the German bishops with Prevost as prefect, was a meeting organized between leading German bishops on the one hand and several curial cardinals led by Parolin on the other, in July 2023. It was the first meeting of its kind, made more notable by the fact that the German bishops had had their ad limina visit where they met the Pope in late 2022.
At the time of the meeting, it had already been announced that Fernandez would replace Ladaria as prefect of the Dicastery of the Doctrine of Faith, but he was only to actually assume office in September. As a result the meeting involved Parolin once again leading the anti-German charge with Ladaria at his side, but with Prevost in place of Ouellet. This raises the question whether the meeting was timed this way by Parolin to ensure he could still count on Ladaria for his first sit down with the German bishops.
What is also quite telling about Parolin’s team is that it was expanded with Cardinal Koch, the conservative prefect for the Dicastery for Christian Unity, Filippo Iannone, the prefect of Dicastery for Legislative Texts and Archbishop Viola the secretary of the Dicastery of Divine Worship and the Sacraments. The relevance of dicasteries for legislative texts (canon law) and divine worship and the sacraments to the German proposals, which challenge much of canon law and push liturgical abuses, is obvious. Koch, on the other hand, only appears to have been relevant for German support for intercommunion with protestants and his inclusion may have been (in part) motivated by the fact that he was a conservative opponent of the Synodal Way.
The absence of You Heung-sik at the meeting (and the later meetings) was most strange as the German Synodal Path pushes for both married priests, a discussion on female "priests" and a radical change in the conception of the priesthood in general. Possibly, his consistent absence was a sign to the Germans that discussions regarding optional celibacy and female clergy were not even on the table.
Also odd was the absence of Roche, where his dicastery was instead represented by (the now rather infamous) secretary Viola. It was a very important meeting to be conveniently absent for (whether cause of alleged illness or scheduling conflicts).
It was predicted a second meeting would be held in November of 2023. Instead it would only end up being held in March 2024, while a joint letter of Parolin together with Prevost and Fernandez (in place of Ouellet and Ladaria) was sent slightly earlier in February of 2024. There somehow ended up being eight months in between the first two meetings and a seven month interval before a new joint curial letter was sent.
All this culminated in the disastrous release of Fiducia Supplicans in December of 2023, shortly after the first session of the Synod on Synodality which was held in Rome in October of that year. Fiducia Supplicans de facto overruled the 2021 Responsum and gave the Germans the ability to claim Roman approval when they had homosexual or adulterous relationships blessed. This led to rapid and widespread revolts of dozens of cardinals and entire bishops’ conferences, especially in Africa (it should be mentioned that Prevost had not yet been made a member of the Dicastery of the Doctrine of Faith at this time and had no role in any of the controversial decisions by Fernandez).
Meanwhile, just before that debacle, Parolin had sent another letter to the Germans in November in which he set out that the sinfulness of homosexual acts and the impossibility of women being ordained were not in any way up for discussions, precisely the issues on which Fernandez was being vague. The backlash to Fiducia Supplicans and Fernandez’ humiliation appear to have vindicated Parolin, as Fernandez would claim to agree with and support Parolin on these points in the aftermath of Fiducia Supplicans and the subsequent ‘clarifications’.
Once Fernandez belatedly supported Parolin on the key points, pressure on the Germans quickly resumed. The February 2024 letter (which was signed by Prevost) was as severe as the earlier letters co-signed by Ouellet and Ladaria, specifically threatening with canonical sanction, and the Germans delayed the vote of setting up a new powerful synodal organization.
The new meeting in March 2024 seemed to have more of an impact than previous Vatican interventions. The Germans agreed that any new synodal body would not just be in agreement with the then ongoing (and uncertain) synod in Rome, but also the ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council (which the Germans rejected from a progressive rather than a traditionalist standpoint) and canon law. Furthermore, any eventual proposal would be submitted to Rome for approval. The German group of experts working on a proposal would have to work closely with experts of the Vatican dicasteries.
Even a proposal from the German episcopal conference for blessings or homosexual, adulterous and unmarried couples was not made public till the sede vacante after Francis’ death. A paper to undermine Church doctrine on birth control seems to have never been published, either.
Understanding the German retreat and its implications
‘Rome says ‘nein’ to German bishops’ synodal committee vote’ was how The Pillar described it and ‘Holy See blocks German “synod council” project’ was how Aleteia put it when the Vatican (with Prevost’s signature) threatened with canonical sanctions in February 2024. At the time of the meeting in March Crux Now used the title ‘Vatican reins in German bishops amid dispute over national reforms’, while in June of 2024 The CatholicHerald announced ‘German Synodal Way: Vatican demands changes to controversial new Church body’.
Apparently, all these titles were wrong. After the conclave, Marx revealed the top secret fact that they should have said, ‘Rome reaches compromise elating German bishops’ or ‘synodal path saved after new blood in the Vatican negotiates a favourable agreement for the Germans’. Similarly, the news in late 2022 and early 2023 should have described how the Synodal Path was nearing its end and how conservative Vatican pressure, due to prelates like Ouellet was successfully pressuring the Germans to restrain their ambitions.
If the German bishops wish to rebels against this, they’ll have to openly break their officially published promise. It is a rather ideal position for Pope Leo XIV to be in (one of the few advantages he has at the beginning) and much different than if a revolution was already ongoing with entrenched structures having been set up.
What Prevost did and did not do
It does however seem unlikely that, if both Prevost and Fernandez were significantly more friendly towards the German Synodal Path, the Germans would have made even the partial concessions that they did in 2024. Instead they would have remained firmly defiant. Prevost was not discredited the way Fernandez was, and if both of Francis’ fresh appointments to two of the most powerful Vatican dicasteries were fresh sympathizers, it would have both left Parolin rather isolated and alone, while also showing Francis was still willing to appoint people who would enable them. Prevost could have opposed Parolin’s letter, even privately, as too authoritarian. Had he criticized it towards Francis, the ailing pontiff, who had already soured on Parolin, is unlikely to have pressured Prevost into supporting it.
From all this multiple things seem apparent:
1. Prevost seamlessly replaced the semi-conservative Ouellet and his role at Parolin’s side dealing with the German bishops, (while taking a more silent approach supporting Parolin’s hardline from the background), whereas Fernandez replacing semi-conservative Ladaria was a huge gamechanger till Fernandez was discredited and fell into line. Fernandez was (viewed as) a possible bridge between the German Synodal Path and Francis’ Vatican, Prevost was not (and not a single source left or right, American, German or Spanish presented Prevost as such at any point before the conclave).
2. The synodal path was not at risked of being killed by Ouellet. The German bishops were defiant right till the end of his time as a prefect and there was never any hint that the Synodal Way was truly at risk and neither the announcement that Prevost would replace Ouellet, nor his first year in office, hamstrung Parolin or elated the Germans at all.
3. The so called compromise reached in 2024 was not the Vatican being merciful on the Synodal Path, while they were previously crushing it, but the German bishops finally caving in and desisting from ‘establishing new facts on the ground’ after the hammer came down severely enough from the Vatican.
Prevost may have taken a more silent listening approach and a more diplomatic tone compared to Ouellet, he might even have played the good cop to Parolin’s bad cop, and it is logical that (some) German bishops would desperately cling to this to hope that he is open to their agenda, but he almost immediately after being appointed followed Ouellet in joining Parolin at every meeting that dealt with the Germans, never excusing himself once, co-signed threatening documents and did not throw the Germans any bone in any interview.
Hollerich and Grech were supportive of the German synod to various extents, Fernandez acted at least open towards them and Tolentino signed off on one of their radical theologians being able to teach, but Prevost was always quietly standing at Parolin’s side as he forced the Germans to the negotiating table where they had to concede again and again.
With the story that Prevost saved the Synodal Way through a compromise formula in doubt, the idea that Marx supported Prevost at all is in doubt, too.
Conclusion
That Marx could pull a narrative of Prevost as a saviour of the Synodal Way out of thin air is in line with the recent trend amongst German bishops to ‘stretch the truth’ for rhetorical purposes. It raises the question whether other progressive cardinals who are sympathetic towards the Germans have engaged in similar attempts to spin the new Pope as progressive in defiance of the truth.
The fact that all the recorded evidence shows Prevost continuing Ouellet’s conservative opposition to the modernist heresies in Germany is hope-giving to faithful Catholics on many levels, as it shows his support for continuity, ability to take a clear side for orthodoxy and a willingness to enforce discipline, if necessary.
If Pope Leo continues the previous stance he had taken against the Germans it could promise a return to the clarity and unity of the days of Pope Benedict XVI. This might be what prelates like Marx fear and why they are in desperate denial.
