by Serre Verweij
When Pope Leo was elected, many traditionalists were initially cautious or did not know what to expect. Then, in his first real interview (with Crux), Pope Leo declined to stand behind Traditionis Custodes; next, his nuncio in the United Kingdom told bishops that they could request exemptions from Traditionis Custodes and that these would be granted automatically, while the persecution of traditionalist religious communities and of bishops who refused to enforce Custodes fizzled out.
Pope Leo met with supporters of the Tridentine Mass; Cardinal Burke was allowed to celebrate it in Rome again; key prelates promoted by Pope Leo (Hicks in New York and Golka in Denver) had been opponents of Traditionis Custodes; and finally, early this year, Pope Leo sent a message to the French bishops encouraging them to be generous toward traditionalists, a message seemingly at odds with Traditionis. There was hope, and even affection, for Pope Leo among traditionalists. Then the unfortunate clash with the SSPX risked souring the situation: Roche began claiming that Pope Leo will not reverse Traditionis (though multiple bishops questioned this claim, including Archbishop Cordileone, who was promoted by Pope Leo); certain bishops decided to apply Traditionis harshly anyway; and finally the traditionalist pilgrims discovered that they were apparently unwelcome in Saint Peter’s Basilica this year.
There have been accusations and counter-accusations, attacks on traditionalists for allegedly making drama, and now what look like attempts at damage control by the Vatican, with dubious claims that the pilgrims were not specific enough in their requests. Rather than add to these controversies, I will say only that it is hard to deny that powerful forces within the Vatican remain, at best, rather cold toward traditionalists. Who these figures are, how much power they have (and why), how this fits into broader Vatican power politics, and what Pope Leo’s stance may be on all of this are the most important questions for the long term. I have even heard from a source that hostility toward traditionalism in Rome is currently at its highest, even worse than under Francis.
Based on all available information, both public and private, it appears that recent developments reflect Pope Leo personally less than they reflect recent ecclesial political developments within Rome. Yet how Pope Leo deals with the political upheaval is likely to determine the future of his pontificate.
The Intolerance of “Moderate” Bergoglionism
The contrast between the constant talk of synodality, inclusiveness, and dialogue (which remain rather popular slogans in the Vatican right now) and the hostility toward traditionalists has rightly been noted.
Yet one alleged hypocritical contrast of which the Vatican has been accused appears somewhat inaccurate: the claim that LGBT pride pilgrimages are welcome in the Vatican (like the scandal James Martin caused in 2025, just after Pope Leo was elected), whereas traditionalists are not. This comparison seems to ignore some crucial context, including the fact that traditionalists were permitted to hold their pilgrimage in 2025 as well, and that Martin has not received any invitations this year either. The year 2026 seems to have been more exclusive overall compared to 2025, which suggests that the chaos of the initial transition has given way to short-term control by (relatively) moderate Francis-era figures.
Unlike Francis, Pope Leo has not sent a single supportive letter to Martin’s Outreach, nor to heretical organizations like New Ways Ministry; and former papal almoner Cardinal Krajewski, who had facilitated the presence of transgender prostitutes as guests during meetings with the poor, found himself exiled back to Poland after decades of service in Rome. Martin’s 2025 visit was almost certainly planned under Francis, unlike the pilgrimage.
But Martin undermines Catholic teachings while traditionalists defend them. That both should be equally excluded is still completely unacceptable. Yet it appears to be a fitting emblem of Parolin, Roche, and the moderate Bergoglian establishment that still holds significant influence within the current Vatican.
Cardinal Secretary of State Parolin, together with Cardinal Roche, prefect of the Dicastery for Divine Worship, and Archbishop Viola, now the former secretary of the Dicastery for Divine Worship (DDW), all grew to dislike the German Synodal Path and radical public activism years ago, and it must be acknowledged that in Francis’s final years they would sometimes push back against new attempts by the Germans to establish facts on the ground, even while Francis himself seemed unwilling to intervene. Then Archbishop Prevost joined this anti-German effort in 2023 after becoming the new prefect of the Dicastery for Bishops.
At the same time, however, they have never let go of their excessive hostility toward the Mass of the saints. Their moderate progressivism is exceptionally bigoted against the liturgy of the ages. Yet as of now their group appears to be the most stable power bloc in the Vatican. This is due to a combination of factors, including built-up networks, long tenures in the Vatican, the complete incompetence of various more radical progressives, and the small number of genuine conservatives still left in active Curial service.
All of this gives anti-traditionalists within the Curia, and specifically the DDW, a certain impunity right now.
Viola and the Future of the Dicastery for Divine Worship
The transfer of Archbishop Viola deserves special attention. He is out as Roche’s successor as the next DDW prefect, and unlike, for example, Archbishop Montanari, secretary of the Dicastery for Bishops, who similarly failed to become the next prefect, Leo has not even given Viola a new five-year term as secretary. Some rumors claimed that he would be made the new prefect of the Dicastery for the Causes of Saints, but this did not happen either. He was removed from the Curia and will no longer affect dioceses across the world through the DDW. Yet he was made Archpriest of Saint Peter’s Basilica and Vicar General for Vatican City State, positions that traditionally, unfortunately, also result in one’s being made a cardinal. As a result, the appointment met with an understandably mixed reaction among orthodox Catholics.
Thankfully, Viola does replace Cardinal Gambetti, a Francis protégé who behaved even worse, and Gambetti, at least, was fully exiled from Rome. Gambetti will now serve as Archbishop of Chieti-Vasto, replacing the modernist Bruno Forte, whose term Pope Leo thankfully did not extend either.
Another contentious decision was Pope Leo’s replacement of Viola as secretary with one of the DDW’s undersecretaries, Aurelio García Macías. Macías has defended the liturgical policies under Francis and the liturgical reforms of the Second Vatican Council and, most importantly, has criticized (the effects of) Pope Benedict’s more tolerant policy toward the traditional Latin Mass. He was part of the Roche-Viola establishment. Like them, he is a product of the Pontifical Liturgical Institute of Sant’Anselmo.
Yet Macías made his anti-TLM comments only after the appointment of Roche and the publication of Traditionis Custodes. As previously noted, he was brought to the Curia by Pope Benedict and advanced under Cardinal Sarah. So far he seems to have lacked the fanaticism in going after traditionalists that Roche, and especially Viola, have demonstrated. Under Pope Leo, his response to traditionalists asking for permission for the Tridentine Mass was simply to refer them back to their obstructing bishop rather than to get involved.
Finally, the point for which he has been most publicly criticized is, ironically, his saving grace: his stance on indigenous liturgies. Macías, in his Curial role, was involved in the approval process for the so-called Mayan Rite (far less excessive than the Amazon rite that progressives still desire). Yet Macías has in fact emphasized strict limits on inculturation experiments involving the liturgy, condemning unnecessary innovation, syncretism, and the promotion of folklore. This may be one of the reasons Pope Leo chose him for an internal promotion in this case.
Macías has accurately been described as someone who carries out the orders of both pro- and anti-traditionalist superiors “with identical diligence,” which makes the identity of the next prefect under whom he works all the more important. All of this leaves the future of the DDW, and of the Tridentine Mass as such, under Pope Leo very much up in the air, even without the opposition to the pilgrimage adding fuel to the fire.
Viola’s not becoming DDW prefect and his not being renewed as secretary are both very good developments. His exile from the Curia landing him at Saint Peter’s, however, is not. The Pillar reported that it is quite possible Cardinal Makrickas was originally supposed to receive Saint Peter’s but refused, and that this caused plans for a more minor post for Viola to fall through. If so, this suggests Leo was in fact considering a more complete demotion for him until those plans fell through. More important, however, The Pillar also raised the possibility that Pope Leo might not make Viola a cardinal, even though that ordinarily comes with his new role. I consulted my most important source, who has made accurate predictions in the past and who also thinks this is a significant possibility, specifically because Pope Leo has the excuse that Francis left the College of Cardinals with too many members, and he will have only so many red hats to spare at his first consistory.
Not (immediately) making Viola a cardinal could serve as one signal of reconciliation toward traditionalists.
Appointing someone with no hostility toward the Tridentine Mass as the new DDW prefect is even more important, however, and is the bare minimum the Pope can do. Preferably, Pope Leo would appoint someone at least moderately sympathetic toward the traditional liturgy, but if not, at least someone who represents a break with the Roche-Viola status quo. If the new prefect is not a cardinal, he is guaranteed to be made one at the next consistory, which makes the appointment even more essential.
Finally, who becomes the new undersecretary is also more important than some might think, as it will determine whether the old guard and culture of the DDW are truly changed.
Leo’s Inaction, Stalled Curial Reforms, and the Synodalist Putsch
The uncertainty regarding the DDW is part of a broader uncertainty about a Curial shake-up. Pope Leo’s change of the guard at the Vatican appears to have stalled significantly and to have run into various obstacles (including some candidates whom he had considered for posts allegedly turning down the offer). This has made it harder for Pope Leo to consolidate his authority.
Pope Leo has two prefects who are nearly seventy-nine years old and at least four who will have to be replaced soon. New prefects were expected months ago, yet no new appointments have been made. Pope Leo apparently even relies on certain relatively moderate progressive Francis allies, such as Farrell and Tagle, to function in the Vatican and to circumvent radicals. Few recent popes have faced a Curia, or a Vatican more broadly, as fanatically and aggressively loyal to their predecessor as Pope Leo does.
Francis left an overpacked College of Cardinals. Either Francis himself or someone claiming to speak for him approved another elaborate multi-year synodal process, to culminate in a general assembly in Rome in 2028, while he was in the hospital. Both Cardinal Fernández and the second-in-command at the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith, Armando Matteo, have openly spoken of projects developed under Francis that should still be completed, putting pressure on Leo not to shelve them.
But by far the worst threat to stability for Pope Leo has been Cardinal Grech and the broader synodal establishment. Shortly after Pope Leo was elected, in the very month of his election, Cardinal Grech took the initiative, with the unprecedented decision to publicly explain the meaning of synodality to the new Pope in a letter co-signed by the synodal undersecretaries Archbishop Luis Marín de San Martín and Sister Nathalie Becquart. Cardinal Hollerich added to this with public statements, of which The New Daily Compass immediately took note. Pope Leo officially let the synodal process continue but quickly attempted to circumvent Grech, with very mixed results so far.
While he has publicly given generic praise to synodality, he has clearly demonstrated that he favors episcopal collegiality and a healthy Curia over revolutionary populism. His decision to begin holding multiple extraordinary consistories with the College of Cardinals very early in his pontificate was taken as a sign that Pope Leo wanted to move decision-making authority away from the Secretariat of the Synod. The meeting with the presidents of episcopal conferences on Amoris Laetitia was viewed in a similar light, especially since the Dicastery for Laity, Family and Life was given a leading role, with the Synod Secretariat supposed to have only a supporting role.
Yet both consistories ended up being held largely according to the synodal format, which appeared to be an ad hoc change. The same happened with the meeting on Amoris Laetitia, while the Synod Secretariat, rather than the Dicastery for Laity, Family and Life, ended up largely controlling the event anyway. Vatican authorities even became defensive when questioned on this point. This resulted in speculation that Pope Leo actually wanted greater involvement from the Synod Secretariat. But if that were the case, why would Leo have tried to sidestep it in the first place? Besides, Pope Leo is not a man to go back and forth on key policies like that. Instead, Grech and his allies simply seem unwilling to relinquish power, something a knowledgeable insider has confirmed, along with Pope Leo’s dislike of this.
Further evidence of this appeared when Pope Leo needed to have lung surgery. Rather than having the surgery two days later, Pope Leo skipped the last days of the meeting and had Cardinal Tagle deliver his (conservative) address on marriage. While a synthesis document was supposed to be published, with bishops to experiment at home on the basis of that document, both the document and any experimentation were delayed accordingly. Instead, Pope Leo is now expected to provide his own commentary on it, or on the meeting, when and if the document is published (in some form). Pope Leo will even look at all the group reports from the meeting individually, rather than merely trusting the synthesis report drafted largely by Grech and his allies. This does not suggest trust in the Synod Secretariat.
Pope Leo’s early-stage cancer was real, and he may have wanted as much recovery time as possible before traveling to Latin America. Yet it does seem that Pope Leo is very familiar with the principle that one should never let a crisis go to waste. In this case, he ensured complete, unrestrained control over any final commentary on ten years of Amoris Laetitia in a way that progressives cannot possibly use to attack him.
Furthermore, while Pope Leo removed Archbishop Marín de San Martín from the Synod Secretariat and made him Papal Almoner instead, thereby separating him somewhat from Grech, Pope Leo still has not appointed a new undersecretary more than half a year later, giving Grech neither a new ally nor a rival who could constrain him. Leo has kept his cards exceptionally close on this issue.
A reliable source I spoke to suspects that Pope Leo wants to deal with Grech and his faction first and will not move against Parolin or other moderate progressives until the synodal faction is effectively neutralized. As previously mentioned, Prevost once worked under Parolin, when Parolin served as the only effective counterweight to the Germans in Rome, and therefore knows how Parolin can be useful.
Broader Indicators for the Future of Tradition Under Pope Leo
Beyond the DDW, and specifically Roche and Viola, there are a few key figures whose replacement will tip Pope Leo’s hand regarding what his pontificate will mean for traditionalists and the liturgy. Considering Parolin’s consistent role in attacking the TLM, many might view him as the key figure to watch, but this is not necessarily so.
Parolin has his own networks. Even Archbishop Rudelli, who has taken more conservative stances on religious freedom and moral theology and has avoided progressive activism, is still connected to Parolin’s network. Rudelli’s letter responding to the pilgrims looks more like that of a bureaucrat simply passing on decisions made by those who are really in charge than like any decision of his own. He was brought to the Vatican only a little over a year ago, when the stonewalling of traditionalist events had already begun.
Simply replacing Cardinal Parolin would not remove the network he represents and in which he is embedded. This is something Pope Benedict XVI learned painfully after he hastily replaced Cardinal Sodano and faced massive sabotage from the Secretariat from then on, and since Leo apparently does not want to fight this faction until at least Grech’s group has been dealt with, he is even less likely to provoke them directly. He can, and likely will, gradually weaken and contain the broader network, however. He has already sent Parolin’s longtime ally, Archbishop Relwendé Kisito Ouédraogo, to become nuncio to the Republic of the Congo.
Archbishop Celestino Migliore, the current nuncio to France, is one key figure to watch in this regard. An important ally of Parolin, he has been among those trying to persecute the Tridentine Mass and aggressively enforce Traditionis Custodes. He has been in his current role since 2020, and the norm is that he will be replaced soon. If Pope Leo does not extend his term and replaces him with someone whose diplomatic career is free of hostility toward traditionalists, similar to how he replaced Pierre as nuncio to the USA with Caccia, this would be a clear signal, especially as France has a very strong, growing, and youthful traditionalist movement and is arguably the country with the strongest support for the Tridentine Mass in the world.
Cardinal Gugerotti, the current prefect of the Dicastery for the Oriental Churches, appointed in early 2022, is another key but more enigmatic figure. He was rumored to be involved in the 2024 plans for a further crackdown on the TLM, which never materialized, and was also touted as a slightly more conservative papabile who could repeal Traditionis Custodes — an ally of Parolin, yet also a possible alternative candidate (who would still have been supported by Parolin’s bloc). Cardinal Gugerotti unequivocally denied any involvement in new attempts to persecute the TLM back in 2024, though he did join Cardinal Parolin (and Archbishop Gallagher) in a more conservative-oriented attempt at damage control after Francis’s pro-Russian statements caused upheaval. If Pope Leo replaces him, this cannot be read as a favor to Parolin, especially since, unlike Archbishop Gallagher, Gugerotti does not appear to be sidestepping or undermining Parolin under Leo. Replacing him could only weaken Parolin’s faction. Even not giving him another five-year term in 2027, but simply keeping him a bit longer on a provisional basis, would give a similar signal. Yet if Pope Leo does plan to replace Parolin with a very different Secretary of State in the near future, he might renew Gugerotti in order to keep the most conservative member of Parolin’s bloc around as a fig leaf.
Finally, the broader State Secretariat will be key to how enduring the legacy of Parolin and the anti-TLM bloc will be. Many of its current figures (Luciano Russo, Daniel Pacho, Joseph Murphy, and others) rose under him. Any enduring change to the entrenched Vatican establishment will require new blood in the State Secretariat.
Conclusion
Personnel is policy. It is trite but true. Even the most powerful emperors needed loyal ministers. Pope Leo needs to assemble his own team, and he needs to do so quickly.
Pope Leo has not yet appointed his own cardinals and is moving very slowly. Only once he is finally able to place those he wants in positions of power can anything be said with certainty about his future policy. Let us pray that he makes the right choices.
