This is the second of several analyses written for Rorate by our contributor Serre Verweij on Leo XIV's first year.
Series: The First Year of Leo XIV
II - LEO AND SYNODALITY
As Pope Leo XIV is approaching the 100 day mark of his pontificate (today is day 97), more and more decisions are coming out which appear indicative of the course of his papacy. Our new Pope is starting to address difficult dilemmas described in Leo XIV: The First 50 Days -- an Analysis.
In this article we outlined many of the challenges Pope Leo faces, quite a few of which are directly related to Francis’ multiyear synodal project plus other reforms and local projects connected to it. Whether to cancel the ecclesial assembly set for 2028 and the process leading up to it, how to deal with local synods in Italy and Ireland, whether to ensure an adequately orthodox African response to the problem of polygamy, and so on.
So far, Pope Leo appears to have alternated between either ensuring a return to orthodoxy behind the scenes, or punting on liberal reforms, not killing them, but leaving their conclusion uncertain. Key curial appointments by Pope Leo will give a more definitive indication of what shape his pontificate will take. Positive patterns do already seem to be slowly emerging, however.
The ecclesial assembly and the implementation of synodality
One of the dilemmas that Leo faced immediately upon becoming Pope, was the fact that Pope Francis had (allegedly) approved an implementation phase for the Synod on Synodality that was due to the last till 2028, when it is to be concluded with an Ecclesial Assembly in Rome, rather than a synod of bishops. The possibility of an assembly involving even more non-bishops worried many orthodox Catholics.
Pope Leo had to start some form of implementation, in order to prevent anarchy where synodality gets misrepresented and abused locally (specifically in liberal parts of the West). The main question was whether he’d quietly cancel the assembly in 2028, or not.
The guidelines for the implementation phase did show some subtle shifts under Pope Leo. For example, conversation in the spirit method based on Ignatian (Jesuit) spirituality was quietly dropped. Instead of a lot of talking for the sake of talking, synodality can now be used to deal with actual concrete issues. Bishops can now use synodality in ways they find appropriate to deal with challenges they face.
Italian media also observed that the genitive ‘of the bishops’ reappeared on the web page of the Secretariat of the Synod, after having vanished during the final years of Francis’ pontificate, when non-bishops were included at the assembly in Rome. Pope Leo explicitly stated that “the Synod of Bishops naturally retains its institutional identity, while at the same time being enriched by the fruits matured in this season.” In his short address Pope Leo emphasized to the full plenary of the secretariat of the synod (all bishops) “you are the body entrusted with gathering these fruits and engaging in forward-looking reflection.”
From this we can at least infer a significant restoration in respect for the episcopacy and that ecclesial assemblies packed with non-bishops will not displace the Synod of Bishops. But will the Synod of Bishops simply be that of bishops again, without the mandatory 10 non-bishops per continent? Was the inclusion of such people for a mixed watered down episcopal synod a transitionary phase to prepare for ecclesial assemblies with a far higher proportion of non-bishops in Rome, while the synod will be purely of bishops again and will the two exist side by side? Or will assemblies with a majority of bishops and a minority of non-bishops (as practiced in 2023-24) become the ecclesial assemblies, while synods will just be a gathering of bishops again?
This would be the best case scenario, but even then some questions would remain. Would these assemblies be held only occasionally, treated as non-events on a media level, be clearly limited to non-doctrinal matters, and would all these limitations be so consistent, apparent and engrained that future Popes could never turn them into a means for revolution again? If so, they might fizzle out like mandatory ecumenical councils did within some years after the Council of Constance.
Or will we see both ecclesial assemblies dominated by non-bishops and Synods of Bishops with a smaller, but still significant, number of non-bishops, which would reduce actual episcopal synods in Rome to a thing of the past? That would be the worst case scenario and it would make the scope of authority of either kind of assembly even more pressing.
Pope Leo’s emphasis on episcopal collegiality and unity decreases the odds for such a radical outcome, but we’ll have to wait to see what he does exactly. He has been left a messy web that is hard to untangle.
Remaining ambiguities quietly shelved?
Some of the unresolved ambiguities in the final document, are centered on the exact authority of the bishops. While the definition of the Sensus Fidei in the document was not openly radical, key nuances that ensured an orthodox interpretation were left out.
The implementation document appears to have quietly buried most of these controversies, too. The Sensus Fidei from the final document is briefly mentioned once, as the start of the gift of the faith the Holy Spirit bestows on the baptized. That's it. It is never used or hinted at, expanded on, or given an ambiguous meaning anywhere else. Nothing is said of laypeople who are consulted have more than a consultative voice or that the authority of bishops as successors to the apostles, or the bishop of Rome as the successor of Saint Peter, is actually limited. At the start of his pontificate Pope Leo referred back to the interpretation of the Sensus Fidei that Francis used at the start of his pontificate, which linked it specifically to popular piety rather than doctrinal change.
Some crucial parts of the relatively short implementation document include:
“Precisely because this is an ecclesial process in the fullest sense of the term, the first person responsible for the implementation phase in each local Church is the diocesan or eparchial Bishop: it is his responsibility to initiate it, officially indicate its duration, methods and objectives, accompany its progress and conclude it, validating its results…
In many places, experience has shown that the adoption of synodal procedures for ecclesial discernment and the elaboration of decisions in a synodal way, based on nos. 87 94 of the FD, does not undermine, but rather consolidates the authority of the Bishop and facilitates the acceptance and implementation of the decisions made…
The consultation phase showed how valuable the work of the synodal teams has been: appointed and supported by the Bishop, they are essential tools for the ordinary animation of the synodal life of the local Churches.
The actual scope of both the assembly and the implementation process seems to be limited, too, along with that of synodality itself, with most controversial questions, quietly taken of the table or resolved. Francis started this process by setting up 10 so called study groups which were to deal with various controversial ethics, from doctrine regarding sex, to female deacons and bishops’ appointments, as well as a canonical commission and organized African response to the pastoral challenge of dealing with polygamists.
Synod study groups sending progressive reforms into the long grass
The study groups set up by Francis were due to report in June. Now, with Leo XIV as Pope, the death of Francis was used as a justification to postpone final reports till the end of this year, in spite of the fact that the ‘sede vacante’ and the conclave took less than a month. Interim reports would be published in July though, in the name of transparency, yet they still haven’t been. All that can be found at this moment on the secretariat site, are interim reports from early October of 2024.
Augustinian undersecretary of the synod, Bishop Luis Marín de San Martín, had already emphasized that any reports would be advisory for the Pope only, Leo XIV has a free hand to shelve all or most of it.
And now two new commissions have been added, on ‘The Liturgy in a Synodal Perspective’ and ‘The Status of Episcopal Conferences, Ecclesial Assemblies, and Particular Councils’ , officially at the request of the Secretariat of the Synod, and for these commissions there does not even seem to be even a planned deadline, nor announcements of who will be serving on them. As the issues are allegedly to be dealt with by commissions, liberal bishops can neither claim the synod clearly spoke on them (in a liberal fashion), nor try to push their own local experiments regarding them.
The African response to polygamy and resurgent conservatism (in diplomatic form)
Meanwhile, the African bishops have had a continental meeting where they discussed the pastoral approach they want to take with regards to those in polygamous unions. This meeting forms the third phase on the process for setting up guidelines which Cardinal Ambongo Besungu outlined last year.
It comes right after the second phase in which proposals were being shared with bishops across the continent and the input of the Dicastery of the Doctrine of Faith was sought. This means the dicastery led by Cardinal Fernandez gave input, but for roughly 2.5 months this occurred with Pope Leo as Pope, rather than Francis. As a result, it is hard not to suspect Pope Leo’s hand in the new document. The document is noticeably less soft and pastoral than Cardinal Ambongo made it sound last year under Francis.
The document clearly shows the hands of multiple authors, some more liberal, and this is apparent in certain paragraphs, but orthodoxy consistently prevails when it comes to the actual guidelines. The worst part of the text might be when it refers to certain parts of Genesis as coming from the priestly or Yahwist sources (references to the ‘documentary hypothesis’ which make the text seem in conflict with declarations of the Vatican under Pope Pius X regarding Mosaic authorship).
As Bishop Bernard Ardura notes, “the Gospel overcomes cultural obstacles and reaches each person in their cultural identity, while cultures, purified of their finitude and sin, flourish by expressing the highest and most fundamental message in the world: God saves us in Jesus Christ and calls us to enter the great family of the Church.
The text focuses predominantly on people who were already in polygamous relations when they converted to Catholicism. Catholics who end up embracing polygamy are only dealt with briefly. The children of polygamists and first wives, who are victims of polygamous husbands, can be baptized, but the approach to those who persist in polygamous relationships is not exactly soft.
The African approach is also radically different to the Germans and Belgians. Liberals and Francis himself had pushed the notion that the Africans could not accept Fiducia Supplicans or a softer approach to homosexuality for cultural reasons. African bishops and cardinals increasingly come out against it, emphasizing that African culture is currently simply more faithful to natural law and the Catholic faith that European missionaries originally brought to them and that they object to sin.
Liberalism in limbo
Both the Germans and their radical allies such as the Belgians, many Austrian and some Swiss bishops, Hollerich, Grech and some others, appear to have completely lost the synodal battle.
-The theological discussion on female priests has remained closed, while ordained female deacons seem more unlikely than ever and non-ordained female deacons are far away in an uncertain future
-Changes to priestly celibacy and ‘viri probati’ are dead in the water
-Homosexual acts and relationships, as well as any extramarital sex and relationships have not been approved
-Polygamy is not being normalized or condoned in Africa
-Development of doctrine based on recent (pseudo)scientifical developments, claims by sociologists, popular opinion or ‘lived experience’ have not been approved
-Communion for those openly living in a sinful sexual relationship (as hinted at in Amoris Laetitia) still did not get consensus support
-Intercommunion with Protestants has not been approved.
-Lay preaching has not been approved
-A vague ‘greater involvement’ of the people of God was approved, but so far not implemented and Cardinal Prevost at the time suggested it would only be the nuncio consulting some more people
-Ambiguities regarding limits of episcopal authority and the Sensus Fidei have not grown into anything so far, either
-Episcopal conferences have not been given meaningful doctrinal authority
-A radical ‘synodal reform’ of seminaries has not been adopted or implemented
This is in extremely sharp contrast to the ultra-modernist frenzy just two to three years ago. The Synod on Synodality was touted for a while as either a de facto third Vatican council or the biggest thing since the Second Vatican Council at least. Some even hoped that a third Vatican Council could be held after the synod, when it was still in its early stages. Is anyone still talking of a third Vatican Council now? Is anyone claiming nowadays that the synod was such an event?
Synodality at this point is advocated more as a consistent ‘way of being Church’ rather than either a concrete reform event or even a recognizable ‘reform process’. It seems to have become the missionary style Francis touted it to be. The Trojan horse became an actual horse apparently.
All the talk of radical plans, decentralization and vote rigging procedures ended up going nowhere. In the early stages of the Synod on Synodality it was suggested that any results of the meeting in Rome would not be approved by the Pope, at least initially, but first presented to all the different local churches for approval. Later it was suggested that official voting by the members at the synod at Rome would be done away with, instead a vague consensus model reminiscent of communist practices was suggested. None of this happened. Voting still happened and virtually all truly radical proposals got rejected.
The final document was still left to receive papal approval. Liberals were hoping for a papal coup where Francis would reintroduce (in ambiguous form) radical proposals rejected by the bishops at the synod (as he did with introducing radical proposals in Amoris Laetitia that had been rejected at the Synod on the Family), but instead Francis for the first time simply made the document magisterial by his authority.
While this was cited as a somewhat revolutionary act, it prevented the document from being useful for concreate unambiguous implementation, and guidelines published soon after both emphasized it as normative, yet not as binding to the letter. Francis himself did fully adhere to it in how he governed the Curia in Rome. One example being how he kept ignoring the Fifth Plenary Council of Australia.
Local synodality
The Fifth Plenary Council of Australia, which concluded in 2022, has served as a microcosm of the slow death of revolutionary synodality. A plenary council carries greater weight than any ordinary decision by the national bishops’ conference or a local synod. Once its decrees are approved by Rome, they’re binding for the whole nation.
The Fifth Plenary Council was held in response to a fallout over the anti-Catholic Royal Commission into sexual abuse, which targeted Catholics (while specifically sparing Islamic organizations the scrutiny of public hearings) and the false conviction of Cardinal Pell. In accordance with progressive practices, there was a consultation of the laity in which elder liberal Catholics were overrepresented. Radicals had tried to highjack the council and push for many of the same heretical topics which are pushed in Germany (married priests, female priests, change in doctrine on sexual ethics, and also, confession being displaced by general absolution).
The unanimous 7-0 acquittal of Cardinal Pell vindicating traditionalists, subsequent behind the scenes lobbying by Pell and his protegee Archbishop Fisher and delays due to Covid all harmed progressive momentum and as a result it ended largely with moderate results that were perfectly in line with Francis (no doctrinal change but less harsh words about LGBT, liturgy specifically for aboriginals, new consultation structures).
The few radical proposals in line with the German agenda which were approved (support for female deacons if Roe adopted them and lay preaching) still resulted in Rome under Francis ignoring the decrees indefinitely and nothing of the council being implemented.
The decrees are still being ignored under Pope Leo, in spite of the final document of the synod in 2024 (approved by Francis) calling for a quick response to such decrees. They’ve now been ignored for three years. If there is any synodal tradition of Francis that Pope Leo has wholeheartedly embraced it is shelving and outright ignoring revolutionary proposals. The timeline provided by the Australian bishops themselves required most of the decrees to have been implemented by now.
While Francis (or certain curial prelates around him) had already put the synodal revolution in Australia on ice, as previously mentioned, there are still issues with modernists attempting to highjack synodality in Ireland and Italy. In Italy specifically, Cardinal Zuppi and other moderate modernists postponed the conclusion of the synod till the end of this year because certain progressive non-bishops objected to the final document not being modernist enough.
Pope Leo in his address on synodality to the Italian bishops, gave them some (not so) subtle hints. While urging them to not be afraid of courageous actions in matters such as outreach to the poor and episcopal collegiality, he specifically linked this to unity and unity with Peter. If certain Italian analysts including Massimo Faggioli are any indication, the address did not go over well with some of the more liberal Italian bishops.
The address seemed similar to Pope Leo’s telegram for the 70th anniversary of the Rio de Janeiro Conference and the creation of CELAM. In his message he encouraged the bishops in Latin American in “affective and effective communion, pastoral initiatives that lead to solutions in accordance with the criteria of the sacred scripture, tradition and the magisterium.”
A push towards unity in orthodoxy from Rome for the local bishops seems back after being on vacation since 2013.
Synodality as mere united evangelization
With Pope Leo apparent doubling down on the downscaling of progressive synodality, liberals currently hold on to the notion that even if synodality does not subvert doctrine or the episcopal hierarchy as such, it at least ends an ‘excessive clericalism’ and empowers the laity to be co-responsible for evangelization. Conservative prelates such as Cardinal Ryś from Poland, for example, have been called liberal for their support for empowering the laity in non-doctrinal and non-governmental matters.
In reality, this is not a progressive standpoint. Laity not deliberating to subvert doctrine or the liturgy, but on how to best give catechesis, organize schools or outreach programs, is hardly progressive. If synodality in the end truly is about co-responsibility and rejecting this excessive form of clericalism, than ironically traditionalist communities do live it to its fullest.
While traditionalists and conservatives desire a return to the liturgy, doctrinal clarity, ethics and sense of community of the 1950s, view wish or try to adhere to a form of clergy worship, or extreme sheepishness. The so called ‘pray, pay and obey’ mentality progressives have derided since the 60s is equally opposed by traditionalists.
How many blogs, sites and videos in the traditionalist community are made by layman and how many by clergy? Who have organized and promoted petitions to save the TLM? Who organize Catholic pro-life events, rosary rallies and have pushed to oppose blasphemous events?
The idea that traditionalists and conservatives are slavish sheep who want to blindly nod and say ‘yes and amen’ to their local priest and bishop is laughable. Traditionalism is very popular amongst the young, both converts and reverts. Traditionalists are quite capable of being anti-clerical in the sense that they oppose priests and bishops who do not practice what they preach, or who think they are masters of the ‘deposit of faith’, rather than its guardians (and liberals can be quite clericalist when they want to oppress faithful Catholics which can be seen in their stance on what is happening in Detroit). Much like the laity during the period of the Gregorian reforms after Rome had endured any of its worst Popes during the 10th century.
Though perhaps this does demonstrate the difference between conservatives and reactionaries. Traditionalists and orthodox Novus Ordo Catholics tend to be reactionary (in the good sense of the word), not conservative. This is why they gravitate towards the faith of their grandparents rather than anything they grew up with, and why they have an objective knowledge of the Catholic faith that is not dependent on constant (re)interpretation by every new Pope or bishop.
Conclusion
Revolutionary agitation is dying down. Orthodoxy survived the last few years of Francis’ pontificate and appears to have come out stronger. The decay of the spirit of the Second Vatican Council is subtle and gradual. One needs to pay close attention to be able to see it.
The extent of the new Pope’s apparent conservatism and his sympathy for tradition still need to become clear. So far however, the early signs are hopeful, even if the new Pope seems not ready (yet) to show overt discontinuity with his controversial predecessor.
