Rorate Caeli

LEO AND THE CHINESE: An Enigma - Part VI in the Series "The First Year of Leo XIV"

 

LEO AND THE CHINESE

by Serre Verweij
for Rorate Cæli




One of the biggest controversies during the recent conclave was the agreement between the Holy See and China approved by the late Pope Francis. The details of this agreement have never been made public, but it allows the Chinese communist government to nominate bishops. As a result, it legitimizes the schismatic state church with state-appointed bishops that has existed for decades, while seemingly throwing the underground Catholic Church faithful to Rome under the bus.


Because of his role in approving the treaty, many orthodox and anti-communist cardinals firmly opposed the papal candidacy of Cardinal Parolin, the Secretary of State of the Vatican. As a result, once Prevost was elected as Pope Leo, instead of Parolin, eyes were instantly on him and what his stance might be regarding China, and communism more generally.


What is Pope Leo’s stance on China, the underground Church and the evils of Communism? Will he oppose them in ways that Pope Francis did not?


A revealing interview


While Pope Leo’s interview with Elise Ann Allen of CruxNow drew a lot of attention, the new Pope’s answers regarding the Church in China appear to have gotten insufficient scrutiny.


“No. I would say that in the short term, I will continue the policy that the Holy See has followed for some years now, and it’s been several predecessors. I in no way pretend to be wiser or more experienced than all those who have come before me. I’m also in ongoing dialogue with a number of people, Chinese, on both sides of some of the issues that are there. I’m trying to get a clearer understanding of how the church can continue the church’s mission, respecting both culture and political issues that have obviously great importance, but also respecting a significant group of Chinese Catholics who for many years have lived some kind of oppression or difficulty in living their faith freely, and without choosing sides.”


Pope Leo makes it clear he will stick to the agreement for the foreseeable future, and as such Catholics should not be shocked when the treaty remains active for the next few years. Yet, he specifically leaves open the possibility he will pursue a different path eventually. The fact that he makes a clear sympathetic reference to the underground church is very significant.


Even more important is the fact that, beyond showing a certain respect for his predecessor and for precedent, Pope Leo gave no real argument in favour of the treaty itself. Similar to Traditionis Custodes, he quite openly refrained from endorsing it or giving real arguments in favour of it. He diplomatically acknowledges what good intentions (are claimed to) have motivated the agreement, while relativizing it as only one perspective.


“The Ostpolitik, the choices that have been made to say in a realistic way, ‘this is what we can do right now, moving towards the future’, I’m certainly taking that into consideration, along with other experiences that I’ve had previously in dealing with Chinese people, in government as well as religious leaders and lay people. It’s a very difficult situation. In the long term, I don’t pretend to say this is what I will and will not do, but after two months, I’ve already begun having discussions at several levels on that topic.”


Also important in this last excerpt is, that while Pope Leo preserves judgement and takes a humble attitude, he is not ignorant of this topic. He has already heard different perspectives on it and acquired firsthand knowledge from the people involved. Yet so far, he has not adopted the perspective held by the appeasers who have dominated Rome in recent years. 


He treats it as a priority topic and has quickly moved to hear perspectives on different levels. One person he consulted early on was Cardinal Duka from Prague, who assured us the Pope has an anti-communist perspective.


Pope Leo and Communism


Duka, a conservative (but according to his own words not traditionalist) said that:


“We had a good discussion about this during our first meeting with Pope Leone XIV. Cardinal Fernando Filoni also gave a very good speech on the Holy See–China agreement.”


He confidently asserted that Pope Leo knew the evils of Communism and that this is also part of why the Pope opposes gender ideology. As Prevost he had visited Czech at least ten times, and during most of these visits he also went to Prague. He met Cardinal Duka at least once, if not several times in this context, and they visited and celebrated mass at an Augustinian monastery that was being rebuild after being destroyed by the communist authorities.


It seems Pope Leo’s anti-Communist roots go very deep. The Argentine blog The Wanderer revealed that the new biography on the Pope described a thorough anti-Marxist who was never a follower of liberation theology. In the 1990s, during his time as a missionary in Peru, he had to specifically deal with the Maoist communist terrorist group Shining Path. 


While then Father Prevost was repeatedly advised to leave Peru as many other missionaries did, he was part of a group that stayed and some of Prevost’s colleagues ended up being martyrs. While Prevost did not forbid his novices from joining protests against far right militias who fought the Chttps://rorate-caeli.blogspot.com/2025/09/leo-in-his-own-words-key-points-of.htmlommunists on behalf of President Fujimori’s regime, Prevost did not join them. 


As such, it should come as no surprise that Prevost visited the monument of the late Spanish leader Francisco Franco, the Valley of the Fallen, and that he has a relic of an Augustinian bishop martyred by the Spanish republicans. His interactions with tens of thousands of Catholics fleeing the Socialist regime in Venezuela, when he was a bishop, likely only reconfirmed to him the evils of Socialism and Communism.


The long game and possible obstacles


While the agreement was initially renewed every two years, in 2024 it was renewed for a four year period. Much like the announcement of the Ecclesial Assembly to take place in 2028, made while Francis was dying in the hospital, it is hard not to view this as an attempt either by the ailing Pope, or progressives in his inner circle, taking advantage of him, to consolidate Bergoglian rule beyond the late Pope’s grave. As a result, Pope Leo’s hands are pretty much tied till 2028. 


Pope Leo cannot openly break with the treaty before then, both because he would too openly throw his predecessor under the bus and because the communist state could use it as a pretext for further persecution. Negotiations for a further renewal in 2028 could give Pope Leo an opening, but even then simply refusing to renew it could backfire. Pope Leo might want to assert that there have been problems with the treaty and request changes that seem reasonable and in could faith. Either the communist state will approve them and Pope Leo can change the balance, or renewal will not happen with rigidity of the state being to blame.


Any struggle with the Chinese government will require extensive preparation. Pope Leo will want both allies in the Vatican preferably in as many influential governments as possible.


Parolin


Any future action of Pope Leo regarding China is (possibly) complicated further, if Cardinal Parolin stands strongly behind the deal. Pope Leo would then have to deal with resistance by the second most powerful person in the Vatican whose connections go much deeper than his own.


Crucially, of all the Bergoglian holdovers, Parolin might be the one Pope Leo is most likely to keep around. At least for five more years, if not even a bit longer than that. This might be surprising to many, but Pope Leo may very well want to be more pragmatic on this front than Pope Benedict XVI was.


Pope Benedict’s decision to replace Sodano so quickly with Bertone, in 2006, might in hindsight have been the worst mistake he ever made, aside from resigning. After he appointed Bertone he faced constant obstruction and opposition from the Secretariat of State. Furthermore, Bertone did not prove particularly adept at the job, then surprisingly refused to back Cardinal Scola as Benedict’s successor and seems to have even had a role in Brazilian left-leaning Cardinal De Aviz becoming Prefect for Religious. 


Pope Leo might decide that Parolin is an institutional power he cannot do without, at least until he builds a strong support base and has a suitable replacement. In many ways Parolin is the opposite of Cardinal Fernandez. 


Fernandez has few, if any, real allies, is wildly disliked, and came to be viewed as a discredited renegade very quickly.

Parolin picked the winning side when reactionary and revolutionary Bergoglians started infighting during his final years and was viewed as having redeemed himself somewhat by several cardinals. He enjoyed actual influential allies during the conclave.

Fernandez was an outsider theologian who lacked the theological rigor to ever becoming prefect for the Doctrine of Faith, while Parolin, for his many faults, is a skilled diplomat with decades of experience.

Because Parolin is such a shrewd diplomat, but for good and for bad, it is hard to know for certain whether he really was a promoter, a pusher of the China deal, or simply the executor. Some point the finger at other important progressives instead.


The shadow role of Sant'Egidio


Around the time of the conclave rumours surfaced that (besides disgraced about Cardinal McCarrick) it had actually been the Sant'Egidio community (to whom both progressive cardinals Zuppi and Mendonça are linked, with the former being a member) that pushed the China deal rather than Parolin. They convinced Francis, and Parolin simply did his job by implementing the vision of the Pope, so the story goes.


With Parolin being intelligent and tactical, the possibility that this is a tale spread either by him or his supporters to increase his chances at the conclave, cannot be discounted. Yet, the Sant'Egidio Community is known as having been rather pro-China (and pro-Russia) for quite a few years at this point and they exerted at least some influence on Francis.


We will likely only get a de facto answer once the deal is altered or revoked, with Parolin still a State Secretary and causing no problems, or when he is removed first.

Whether Parolin was the promoter or the executor is somewhat important, but not exceptionally so. If Parolin himself is not fanatically devoted to the agreement than Pope Leo will have a significantly easier time making alterations to it or rejecting it altogether, but undoing a treaty with a powerful nation and approved by your predecessor remains a difficult task. Removing Medonça from Rome and replacing Zuppi as president of the Italian episcopal conferences can serve to lessen Saint Egidio influence in any case. But this will take some time to accomplish.


For the short term: Actual adherence to the agreement


A hopeful sign so far, is that the Chinese government has not unilaterally made any appointments yet with Pope Leo begrudgingly approving them afterwards. This happened under Francis and it was one of the worst aspects of the agreement. The treaty was not even adhered to but constantly violated in the state’s favor. Perhaps with Pope Leo, the government views him as less of a pushover or as less pro-communist, and they are trying to preserve good will. At close to half a year of Leo’s papacy, it is too early to know for certain, but at least so far the Pope seems to have an actual role in appointing new appointments.


Another problem under Francis was that he actively instructed underground bishops, who were far below the retirement age, to step down. So far under Pope Leo, two underground bishops, Joseph Lin Yuntuan and Joseph Ma Yanen, were recognized by the state as serving as auxiliary bishops to state-approved bishops instead.


The Chinese authorities also had a habit of redrawing diocesan boundaries to match with state boundaries. Pope Francis tended to begrudgingly approve such actions after the fact, just as he did with episcopal nominations. Pope Leo approved the suppression of two dioceses (Xuanhua and Xiwanzi) and the creation of a new one (Zhangjiakou), but this was approving changes made decades ago rather than recently, and they were actually practical, as these diocesan boundaries had become rather outdated.


As long as Pope Leo ensures that the Chinese government actually respects the treaty, rather than using it as a pretext for further persecution, its damage is somewhat contained. 


For now, the appointment of a new auxiliary for Hong Kong will indicate Pope Leo’s exact approach for the next few years. Will Pope Leo appoint the regime appeaser Choi Waiman or Cardinal Zen ally Joseph Ha Chishing?

Pope Leo can show he is not a pushover and appoint a hardliner, yet risk a confrontation before he is ready, or appoint someone  closer to Chow, preserving a friendly stance towards Peking and refusing to tip his hand, but being accused of continuing the betrayal under Francis, including by traditionalist outlets. 

Conclusion


Pope Leo’s apparent history of anti-Communism would seem to put him closer to Pope John Paul II. Any decisions regarding China will at least not result from a fairytale view of communism as humane or good. Pope Leo has shown that he favours long term strategy and prudence. So far his prudence does not appear to have resulted in cowardice or indecisiveness. 


As faithful, we have reason to be relatively optimistic and to pray that Pope Leo will do the right thing at the right moment. Till then, it looks so far as if he is making the best out of a bad situation.